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ABSTRACT 
 
EYE MOVEMENT EFFECTS IN SIMULATED OBJECT  
RECOGNITION MEMORY IMPAIRMENT 
 
by 
Dmitriy Kazakov 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor David C. Osmon, Ph.D., ABPP-CN 
 
Malingering is the purposeful fabrication of symptoms for secondary gain. Memory problems are 
the most reported symptom, and object recognition tests are often used in clinical settings to 
evaluate these claims. Past research has shown that eye movements can indirectly index memory, 
in that greater viewing is directed at studied stimuli 500-750 ms after display onset. The present 
study evaluated eye movements as a potential method of detecting feigned memory impairment. 
Forty-eight participants, half simulators, studied standardized images and took a memory test. 
Several levels of analysis were used to detect broad trends and brief effects. Simulators 
performed significantly worse on the behavioral task, but also directed less viewing time towards 
studied stimuli overall and during the first 3s when providing correct responses. On Miss trials, 
they viewed studied stimuli even less in the last 3s. Although simulators demonstrated the early 
viewing effect, it occurred slightly later (750-1000 ms). The 250 ms data provided more useful 
information, as did Hit-Miss difference scores. A behavioral measure (corrected recognition 
score) emerged as the single best indicator of malingering. However, eyetracking methodology 
was able to provide five eye movement variables that demonstrated good psychometric 
properties and provided incremental diagnostic utility allowing for all cases to be correctly 
classified. Therefore, a multimethod approach proved to be most effective in detecting simulated 
memory impairment in this sample. 
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Eye Movement Effects in Simulated Object 
Recognition Memory Impairment 
 Psychological assessment is a process that involves the evaluation of several different 
areas of functioning within a particular context. It relies to a great extent on test data, but should 
also include personal interviews and collateral information from third parties (e.g., family 
members, schools, etc.). Evaluations may be requested by the client themselves, an employer, a 
health provider, or a government agency. In many of these evaluation contexts, the question is 
whether the patient or client has impairment in one or more functional areas. Determining if such 
impairment exists involves examining brain-behavior relationships, which is the realm of 
neuropsychology. As many of these contexts offer some kind of compensation for impairment, 
the potential for malingering is likely to be high.  
Malingering refers to the purposeful fabrication or exaggeration of symptoms for 
secondary gain. Secondary gain refers to a benefit to be gained from having a particular 
condition, disability, or diagnosis that has an external motivation (Heilbronner et al., 2009). 
Primary gain would describe the benefit of going through the evaluation process to relieve a 
physical or emotional symptom, as there is an internal motivation to alleviate discomfort. 
Sympathy gained from others by malingering would also fall under primary gain if the goal is to 
receive attention, but may also result in secondary gain if others choose to provide additional 
help. Stone and Boone (2007) describe humanity’s long history of malingering for various 
reasons. Most cases of malingering involve monetary gain, access to services, and/or 
absolvement from responsibility. Monetary gain may include larger lawsuit settlements and 
receiving a disability pension. Access to services may include receiving medical treatment, 
subsidized government services, student accommodations, and access to medication (for self-
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medicating or for selling). Absolvement from responsibility may include time off from school or 
work, discharge from military service, or avoiding criminal prosecution. All of these benefits 
represent incentives for people to engage in malingering in a variety of evaluation contexts.  
Determining the validity of obtained test results is of paramount importance. The 
Neuropsychology Model LCD Taskforce (2011) has published a list of domains that should be 
evaluated during the course of a complete neuropsychological evaluation. Motivation and effort, 
the final category on the list, is most relevant to malingering and deception detection. The 
National Academy of Neuropsychology, one of the major neuropsychological practice 
organizations, released a position paper (Bush et al., 2005) specifically stating that:  
When the potential for secondary gain increases the incentive for symptom exaggeration 
or fabrication and/or when neuropsychologists become suspicious of insufficient effort or 
inaccurate or incomplete reporting, neuropsychologists can, and must, utilize symptom 
validity tests and procedures to assist in the determination of the validity of the 
information and test data obtained. (p. 425-426) 
The American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology, another major practice organization, 
released a consensus statement also supporting the need for detecting non-credible performance 
whether it be from insufficient effort or response bias in clinical and forensic contexts 
(Heilbronner et al., 2009). 
It should also be noted that malingering may be confused with factitious disorder. 
Malingering is not categorized as a disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Additionally, while malingering 
and factitious disorder both involve deceptive presentation, someone with factitious disorder 
would engage in this behavior in the absence of an external incentive. For example, their goal is 
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to adopt a “sick role,” rather than to obtain compensation of some sort. The DSM-5 definition 
offers that a combination of factors may increase the likelihood that the individual may be 
malingering. These factors are: a medicolegal context, a marked discrepancy between subjective 
and objective claims, a lack of cooperation during evaluation and treatment plan adherence, and 
the presence of antisocial personality disorder. 
Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) developed a comprehensive set of diagnostic criteria 
for this kind of presentation, which was termed malingered neurocognitive dysfunction (MND). 
This approach sought to codify the different ways in which a patient’s presentation may suggest 
the presence of malingering. In essence, these criteria are a checklist of potential discrepancies in 
the patient’s data – the more discrepancies, the more likely that malingering is present. Criterion 
A requires the presence of a substantial external incentive at the time of the evaluation. Criterion 
B requires evidence from neuropsychological testing: definite negative response bias; a probable 
response bias on other kinds of well-validated tests of malingering; discrepancies between 
obtained and reference group data, observed behavioral presentation, reliable collateral reports, 
or documented background history. Criterion C requires evidence from self-report: discrepancies 
between reported and documented history, between self-reported symptoms and known reference 
group symptoms, between self-reported symptoms and behavioral observations, between self-
reports and collateral information, or evidence of malingering through well-validated self-report 
scales of questionnaires. Criterion D requires that the relevant behaviors from criteria B and C 
are products of volitional decision making, rather than a known disorder that may account for 
such behavior.  
Slick et al. (1999) propose three levels of MND: definite, probable, and possible. The 
definite and probable levels differ based on the number and quality of B and C criterion evidence 
4 
 
available. Definite MND requires criteria A and D, as well as a definite negative response bias. 
Negative response bias refers to statistically significant below-chance performance on at least 
one forced-choice cognitive measure. Probable MND requires criteria A and D, as well as either 
a minimum of two pieces of criterion B evidence or one from criterion B and at least one from 
Criterion C. Possible MND is used for the weaker cases for malingering given available 
information. This category requires criteria A and D and at least one piece of evidence from 
criterion C. Alternatively, one may meet criteria for definite or probable MND with the 
exception of criterion D, meaning that the deceptive behavior is fully accounted for by a 
psychiatric, neurological, or developmental factor. Slick et al. (1999) have placed a premium on 
negative response bias and results from tests specifically designed to detect malingering, rather 
than on individual performance that significantly deviates from known patterns of brain 
functioning. Here, “known patterns of brain functioning” refers to performance profiles obtained 
from reference groups having distinct conditions that exhibit a measurable impairment in one or 
more cognitive abilities. Additionally, evidence from discrepant patterns of performance in 
obtained test data is valued over discrepancies in self-reported symptoms.  
Despite the apparent standard practice of including tests of malingering as part of an 
evaluation, this decision has its detractors. The Office of the Inspector General (2013) recently 
published a congressional response report regarding symptom and performance validity testing 
in Social Security Administration (SSA) disability determinations. Each U.S. state may have its 
own disability determination services and SSA allows them, or an administrative law judge 
overseeing the case, to purchase consultative examinations. These may include medical exams or 
procedures (e.g., X-rays), laboratory tests (e.g., blood, urine), or psychological testing. SSA does 
not allow for the purchasing of symptom and performance validity tests (SVTs and PVTs, 
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respectively) and has done so since the early 1990s. It was claimed that current S/PVTs were 
psychometrically flawed and would not contribute to a disability determination, and therefore, 
not worth the cost. Specifically, it was claimed that “there is no test that, when passed or failed, 
conclusively determines the presence of inaccurate self-reporting” (p. 2).  
However, at the same time, SSA does state that symptom validity tests could provide 
useful information and that all relevant evidence (including medical evidence) in a case record 
should be considered. This also includes statements made by claimants about their symptoms or 
impairment, given that their statements are credible. Given this information, it may be concluded 
that the SSA acknowledges that S/PVTs may provide useful credibility information to SSA in 
order to make a claim determination, but that it is only willing to consider results from S/PVTs 
that it did not have to purchase. In the same document, the Office of the Inspector General’s 
(2013) review of the extent of S/PVT use by other agencies indicates that they are indeed used to 
a great degree. In addition to position statements by major neuropsychological organizations 
(Bush et al., 2005; Heilbronner et al., 2009), private insurance companies allow the purchase of 
S/PVTs and seem to consider that they provide useful information for decision-making. It should 
be noted that the result from any S/PVT alone may not be conclusive proof of malingering, but 
that the result must be considered along with obtained test data, observations, and collateral 
information. 
This policy creates an opportunity for arguments to be made about ethical and financial 
obligations. As of December 2011, SSA pays over $169 billion to approximately 16.9 million 
recipients each year, which includes Supplemental Security Income and Social Security 
Disability Insurance recipients with a range of medical and/or psychological conditions (Office 
of the Inspector General, 2013). Chafetz and Underhill (2013) estimated that $20.02 billion in 
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2011 was disbursed to claimants (excluding spouse and child beneficiaries, as well as SSI 
beneficiaries over age 65) who were malingering a mental disorder, given a base rate of 40% 
(Larrabee, Millis, & Meyers, 2009). This is significant because reported base rates of 
malingering from practicing clinical neuropsychologists for criminal and civil cases are two and 
three times greater than for cases with no clear financial component, respectively (Mittenberg, 
Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002).  
The ethical guidelines put forth by the American Psychological Association (2010) 
provide five principles that seek to guide decision-making when we are functioning in 
professional capacities. Principle A states that we must take steps to benefit those we work with 
and do no harm to them. Principle B states that we have scientific and professional 
responsibilities to the community and to society as a whole, and that we form trusting 
relationships with those we work with. Principle C states that we promote truth in psychology 
and do not participate in misrepresentations of fact. Principle D states that we must work for 
justice, equality, and fairness so that all can gain from psychological services. Principle E states 
that we must respect everyone’s individual rights and dignity to allow them to make their own 
decisions. 
All five principles are in effect when the question of malingering is being considered, but 
SSA’s guidelines seem to make it difficult to adhere to the ethics code. A psychologist’s goal 
when completing an evaluation is to use their expertise and the best scientific assessments 
available to arrive at the most valid diagnosis. When a patient is being straightforward and 
adequately applying themselves on all assessments, a valid diagnosis is much easier to achieve. 
Based on the principles, when patients are actively trying to manipulate the system for personal 
gain, it is our responsibility to identify them and ensure that they do not receive undue benefits or 
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compensation. If a malingerer is not identified, SSA (or other funding source) is spending money 
on this individual that should instead be used to pay for treatment or compensation for a claimant 
with legitimate impairment.  
Symptom and Performance Validity in Psychological Assessment 
Malingering has been the subject of a large amount of scientific research in the past 
several decades. The goal of this kind of research is to determine the most valid and reliable 
ways of detecting malingering. The term malingering has traditionally implied some sort of 
symptom exaggeration or fabrication. Therefore, specific tests or methodologies that have been 
developed to detect malingering were named symptom validity tests (SVTs). Symptom invalidity, 
however, is not the only reason for noncredible performance. Larrabee (2011) has proposed that 
these tests be renamed performance validity tests (PVTs). Some SVTs are designed to be 
relatively easy to pass, even for those with legitimate and severe neurological conditions. Others 
use a forced-choice presentation model, wherein respondent performance is compared against 
chance. This is also why test results of all psychological tests, not just SVTs or PVTs, are 
compared against known reference groups, so as to determine if the patient in question is 
displaying a pattern of symptom reporting or test performance that departs from known patterns 
of brain functioning as evident from neuropsychological testing (Slick et al., 1999). 
Larrabee (2012) suggests that even if severely impaired groups are able to pass such a 
test, then it requires but a small amount of neurocognitive capacity and the amount of effort 
exerted in the activity is rather small. Therefore, the argument is that anyone who fails a PVT is 
not exerting optimal, or even reasonable, amounts of effort. Larrabee (2012) has therefore 
spearheaded a movement to repurpose symptom validity as the accuracy of a self-reported 
symptomatic complaint. Performance validity, therefore, will be used to refer to the validity of 
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performance on an actual ability task. This distinction is important because tests measure 
behavioral output, which we infer as the result of cognitive processes. The cognitive processes 
being tested may very well be influenced by effort, among other things. Because we can only 
ever measure output using these tests, a test score that was produced with low effort may appear 
impaired (Millis, 2009). This is especially true on tests that were not designed specifically for the 
purpose of detecting deception, such as intelligence tests; suboptimal effort would result in the 
illusion of impaired performance and would possibly lead to a diagnosis of intellectual disability.  
Good effort, on the other hand, does not mean obtaining a better score. Instead, it means 
that the obtained score is most indicative of the person’s ability at the time. PVTs are necessary, 
then, to determine if obtained test scores are valid, or can be interpreted for the purposes of 
diagnosis or treatment. Bigler (2012), however, suggests that effort itself is a construct muddled 
by secondary influences, such as stress, anxiety, and depression. For example, mental flexibility, 
working memory, processing speed, new learning, and semantic fluency are among the most 
commonly affected abilities in depression (Basso, Miller, Estevis, & Combs, 2013), while 
attentional processes are significantly affected in patients suffering from anxiety (Clarke & 
Macleod, 2013). Because of the wide range of secondary influences and demographic variables 
to consider, it is highly important to select the best, but also most appropriate tests for detecting 
suspect effort and symptom invalidity (Ziegler & Boone, 2013). 
A larger problem that Bigler (2012) identifies is that SVTs and PVTs are not infallible. 
Much like how actors practice their lines and actions to get into character, a disability claimant 
(or other individual with incentive) may do research about or be coached about what credible 
performance for a particular condition looks like or how a clinical population actually presents. 
Youngjohn (1995) published an account of coaching and information being provided to a client 
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by his attorney prior to a neuropsychological evaluation. Lawyers, although not specialists in 
medicine or psychology, can provide impaired test profiles similar to those provided by 
physicians if provided with relevant literature (Schwartz, Gramling, Kerr, & Morin, 1998). 
Clients with this advice could then potentially appear impaired with some success when under 
scrutiny. While raw test data cannot be presented in court due to copyright, lawyers are not 
barred from accessing scientific literature and from learning about specific tests from publicly 
available test interpretation books in order to assist with their cases. Therefore, even though 
research simulators provided with information could be identified when compared to legitimate 
brain injury profiles (Schwartz, Gramling, Kerr, & Morin, 1998), a lawyer knowledgeable in 
how clinical disorders truly present can help improve their client’s chances of avoiding detection. 
Certainly, the influence of coaching and information is an important consideration in 
malingering detection and research for the clinical and forensic arenas (Lees-Haley, 1997). 
In a study of simulators, it was found that some amount of preparation prior to testing is 
common and that the most common strategies were memory loss and slower reaction time (Tan, 
Slick, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2002). Memory loss is the favored malingering strategy for several 
groups, including inpatients and incarcerated individuals (Iverson, 1995). Simulators also find it 
difficult to maintain their chosen strategy due to issues with maintaining concentration or 
consistency, inhibition, or embarrassment (Tan et al., 2002). This suggests that malingerers may 
not adhere to the same strategy throughout the duration of the evaluation, or may adjust the 
amount of effort exerted based on the perceived importance of a test. 
Coached simulators provide above-chance performances on validity tests which, while 
still below threshold for optimal effort, are nonetheless different from below-chance 
performances provided by uncoached simulators (Martin, Bolter, Todd, Gouvier, & Niccolls, 
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1993). They are also less likely to be identified than uninformed simulators (Rose, Hall, Szalda-
Petree, & Bach, 1998). Even so, coached simulators still perform better than those who were not 
coached, even if they received information (Dunn, Shear, Howe, & Ris, 2003). This presents a 
practical problem because not all psychologists utilize the same batteries or even individual tests. 
While some tests are better at detection than others, the selection criteria for which specific tests 
are used in an evaluation are numerous. They include test availability, cost per administration, 
training, equipment, recommendation from fellow practitioners, use in scientific literature, 
preference for particular developers or publishers, and information from professional 
conferences. Therefore, a malingerer may have a better chance of evading detection depending 
on the cutoff scores of the specific tests administered to them. Administering multiple symptom 
and performance validity tests is recommended in order to have the best chances of identifying 
malingerers through convergent measures (Gorny & Merten, 2005). This approach is somewhat 
of a double-edged sword: using several can provide incremental diagnostic utility, but not all 
PVTs are equivalent in design and psychometrics, making it difficult to compare across results. 
DenBoer and Hall (2007) found that only 32% of participants who were asked to simulate 
traumatic brain injury symptoms were successful in providing adequate effort. However, 76% of 
the successful participants were coached on actual symptom presentation and behaviors to avoid 
during testing. Simulators who received coaching on detection avoidance strategies were harder 
to detect than those provided with accurate symptom presentations or those receiving no 
coaching (Rüsseler, Brett, Klaue, Sailer, & Münte, 2008). In fact, a simple warning that efforts to 
malinger may be detectable led to fewer simulators being correctly identified (Suhr & Gunstad, 
2000). Gorny and Merten (2005) found that a combination of providing symptom information, 
warning about malingering detection, and explaining SVT principles led to greater pass rates. 
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These highly informed simulators were also better able than other groups to identify more SVTs 
and PVTs in the battery. This suggests that well-informed litigants can be taught to identify 
malingering tests, provide optimal effort on them, but then malinger on standard non-
malingering neuropsychological tests. 
Despite the recent advances in symptom and performance validity test development, no 
single test is perfect and the influence of preparation can affect detection accuracy on a wide 
variety of tasks (Coleman, Rapport, Millis, Ricker, & Farchione, 1998; DiCarlo, Gfeller, & 
Oliveri, 2000; Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Rapport, Farchione, Coleman, & Axelrod, 
1998). Simulators, regardless of the amount of provided coaching or information, also have a 
tendency to respond slower (Rose, Hall, & Szalda-Petree, 1995; Tan, Slick, Strauss, & Hultsch, 
2002). Dunn et al. (2003) replicated this finding and found no difference between different 
coaching and information simulator groups. It was noted that simulators also had greater 
variability in response times, while participants asked to do their best evidenced very little 
variability. Known base rates are concerning, especially given the ability of healthy volunteers to 
pass an effort test administered in a language other than their own (Richman et al., 2006). 
Therefore, Dunn et al. (2003) suggest that response time may also have value as a clinical 
indicator of malingering, for which there is experimental evidence (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-
Dack, 2005; Willison & Tombaugh, 2006). 
Additionally, functional imaging studies support the idea of differential recruitment of 
brain areas when feigning compared to truth-telling (Abe et al., 2006; Browndyke et al., 2008; 
Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2006; Langleben et al., 2005; Mohamed et 
al., 2006; Nunez, Casey, Egner, Hare, & Hirsch, 2005; Spence et al., 2001). For example, control 
recognition performance in Browndyke et al.’s (2008) sample was only associated with 
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dorsomedial parietal and inferior occipitotemporal areas. Simulators had increased medial 
temporal lobe and inferior parietal activity during both misses and false alarms. Simulators also 
had secondary activation: dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal areas were specifically 
associated with misses, while the ventrolateral prefrontal area was more active during false 
alarms. Successful malingering would benefit from persistent monitoring of past responding and 
probabilistic outcomes, which is associated with medial temporal and inferior parietal activity 
(Lee et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001; Spence et al., 2004). This differential recruitment, 
especially in prefrontal areas, suggests that deceptive responses require a greater deal of 
resources for cognitive control, and are therefore more effortful, relative to true responses. 
 Symptom and performance validity testing has been established as a critical part of the 
neuropsychological examination. Current malingering detection methods, such as the Word 
Memory Test (Green, 2005), have demonstrated high sensitivity and specificity but are not 
infallible. Despite evidence of their utility, secondary influences may impact patient performance 
on these tests, and in different ways depending on current emotional state, as well as comorbid 
psychological and medical disorders. There is a need for the identification and development of 
newer methodologies for malingering detection that are less, or even completely not, reliant on 
verbal responses such as MRI, EEG, eyetracking, and others. Because memory has been 
identified as the chief complaint reported by both credible and noncredible patients, as well as 
the area most tapped in existing PVTs, a new memory test would have the greatest impact on 
malingering detection practice. 
Eye Movements as a Visual Index of Memory 
 Much of the foundational oculomotor research focused on properties of visual stimuli and 
how they affect viewing patterns. Visual stimuli are rarely perceived alone without the context of 
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other objects in the visual field. Therefore, many of the early studies on eye movements 
investigated the viewing of multi-object scenes or objects with multiple features. The visual 
system categorizes certain features as important and others as redundant, with important features 
receiving greater viewing time or gaze duration (Buswell, 1935; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967). 
The eyes are led to fixate on these important features, while the so-called redundant features are 
perceived through peripheral vision. Edges, and especially those which are rougher and less 
predictable evidenced greater viewing than contours (Mackworth & Morandi, 1967). The 
luminance gradient, responsible for edges, is one of the ways in which the brain determines what 
stimuli to prioritize and perceive more closely than others. Buswell (1935) also noted that 
providing viewers with specialized instructions or a question to answer about a scene could 
change viewing patterns with different features receiving importance based on the provided 
guidelines. Antes (1974), however, showed that while informative details receive greater 
attention overall, this pattern occurs in early viewing and less relevant details of a picture were 
fixated on for longer in later viewing. Additionally, stimuli that trigger a spontaneous 
recollection of the encoding experience received more fixations than those that were novel or 
familiar to participants without triggering recollection (Kafkas & Montaldi, 2012).  
Although perceptual features of visual stimuli are naturally processed first, semantic 
properties are also taken into account (Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999). Loftus and 
Mackworth (1978) also showed that there is an early viewing effect, in addition to more frequent 
and longer fixation, for stimuli that are out of place in a scene, providing further evidence of the 
importance of semantic aspects. Stark and Ellis (1981) showed that subsequent viewing of 
familiar stimuli produced nonrandom viewing behavior. Initial viewing involves scanning for 
features, as mentioned previously, but viewing the same stimulus again constrains viewing 
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behavior such that “scanpaths” begin to emerge and the salient features of a stimulus receive the 
most attention.  
Neal Cohen and his colleagues were instrumental in building a strong evidence base for 
the use of eye movements in memory research. Althoff and Cohen (1999) demonstrated the 
emergence of different viewing patterns for famous (i.e., familiar) and nonfamous (i.e., novel) 
faces, which is in accordance with past exposure. While participants fixated on main facial 
features more than other face areas for both types of faces, viewing patterns were more 
constrained for famous faces in that the eyes received significantly greater viewing than the 
mouth. Essentially, upon exposure to a previously viewed stimulus, participants examine less of 
the stimulus and make fewer fixations. This was also proposed to be an obligatory, rather than a 
cognitively controlled, response to having previously processed the presented images (Althoff, 
1998; Althoff et al., 1998; Althoff & Cohen, 1999). 
This eye movement-based viewing effect has been used indirectly to measure memory 
deficits, especially in amnesia. The indirect approach here refers to measuring a behavior (i.e., 
viewing) indicative of memory for a stimulus that occurs independently of an explicit statement 
of memory. Amnesic patients and controls both engaged in this repetition effect to the same 
degree; however, only controls exhibited a relational manipulation effect (Ryan, Althoff, 
Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000). The relational manipulation effect is an increase in viewing directed 
to regions of a visual scene that have been manipulated in some way from its initial presentation. 
This finding is significant because it partialed out relational learning deficits from general 
deficits in explicit or declarative memory. Although some implicit or domain-specific procedural 
memory can be compromised in amnesia (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993), performance on explicit 
memory tests is expected to be significantly worse. An indirect memory test, such as the increase 
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in viewing constraint resulting upon subsequent viewing of stimuli, is one measure that can be 
used to determine if learning has taken place. Eye movements are also able to detect if an 
individual recognizes studied faces early in viewing (1000-2000ms after display onset) when 
studied faces were presented with two morphed versions of the studied face. This 
disproportionate viewing effect was evident before and regardless of explicit responses 
(Hannula, Baym, Warren, & Cohen, 2012). 
This is important because explicit statements about memory necessarily reference a past 
learning experience. Ryan et al. (2000) argue that poor explicit memory test performance, 
therefore, could be indicative of deficits in declarative memory. The authors concluded that 
amnesics were unable to engage in creating relational memory binding for objects in the original 
scenes, such that they did not attend to the scene manipulations as the controls did. Hannula et al. 
(2010b) also found that eye movement behavior patterns indicate relational memory impairment 
in schizophrenic patients, but no impairment on item memory. Additionally, more severe 
symptoms of schizophrenia were associated with worse task performance. Williams et al. (2010) 
investigated relational memory time course differences in the early viewing effect in 
schizophrenic patients, finding that viewing directed at studied faces is significantly reduced and 
occurs later in the trial following display onset (1250-1500ms vs. 500-750ms) compared to 
controls. From this, we know that eye movements have potential for providing detailed 
information about several kinds of memory deficits and may be a useful implicit measure. 
Subsequent research has identified an early viewing effect of previously studied stimuli. 
Disproportionately greater viewing was directed at critical objects 500-750ms after test display 
onset in a relational memory task (Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007). In this study, 
participants must use relational memory to learn associations between scenes and faces. The 
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early viewing effect was observed regardless of whether an explicit response was required. 
However, not providing a scene preview led to the emergence of the effect 1000-2000ms 
following onset of the full stimulus display. It should be noted, however, that eye movement 
patterns were sensitive to studied stimuli associates approximately one second before an explicit 
response was given. Given these results, it is believed that the scene preview enables faster 
retrieval of the associated face due to pattern completion, resulting in the observed eye 
movement effect occurring earlier in the trial. Amnesics tested using the same paradigm 
performed significantly worse than controls on the behavioral task, and their data did not indicate 
a relational memory effect even when recognition responses were correct. On incorrect trials, 
though, they directed disproportionate viewing to the face associated with their incorrect 
response rather than the correct face (response intention effect). When associated stimuli were 
presented together for amnesics, disproportional viewing did not emerge at any point during the 
trial. 
Task demands also exert a significant influence on eye movements. When participants 
were instructed to not look at familiar faces, more time was spent viewing novel faces 
throughout the course of the trial. Similarly, when told to freely view three-face displays in 
preparation for a memory test, greater viewing was also directed to novel faces. Presumably, this 
is because familiar faces already have representations in memory, prompting participants to learn 
the novel faces in order to perform better on the test. When instructed to explicitly identify 
familiar faces, greater viewing was directed to familiar rather than novel faces (Ryan, Hannula, 
& Cohen, 2007). However, before any task demands can be met, a stimulus must first be 
identified as being familiar. In the condition requiring participants to not look at familiar faces, 
when presented with a famous face that was not presented in the experimental context, 
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disproportionate viewing occurred as early as 500-1000ms following display onset, following 
which viewing was diverted to novel faces. It should also be noted that people are almost always 
confident in their memory judgments, such that disproportionate viewing of familiar items in a 
relational task occurred sooner and was more likely when participants were most confident in 
their responses on correct trials only (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012). 
This viewing effect for novel views of familiar faces is explained by the absence of an 
identical memory representation for that specific image of a famous face within the experimental 
context (Ryan et al., 2007). When a studied famous face was present in the display, preferential 
viewing away from it emerged as early as 1000-1500ms, and as early as 2000-2500ms when 
presented with a studied non-famous face. It is argued that the absence of an identical match in 
recent memory requires more effort to correctly identify a novel famous face as famous, which 
led to the emergence of a novel face viewing preference 3500-4000ms following display onset. 
When participants were instructed to identify familiar faces, disproportionate viewing emerged 
500-1000ms into the trial for both famous and non-famous studied faces, but at 1000-1500ms 
after display onset for novel famous faces. Ryan et al. (2007) state that this eye movement 
behavior is obligatory and is a function of past exposure, such that memory is the primary factor 
driving scanning and task demands being secondary.  
Schwedes and Wentura (2012) replicated this early viewing effect using a visual 
concealed knowledge task and evaluating the first three fixations. By reducing the presentation 
time for a visual stimulus, it is also possible to detect deception, as well as prevent potential 
coaching or countermeasures employed to subvert the test (Bowman, Filetti, Alsufyani, Janssen, 
& Su, 2014). This, along with the early viewing effects, suggests that deception can be detected 
at both early and late stages in a given trial. If information is presented rapidly, there is little to 
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no opportunity to consider or formulate an alternate response. But if information is presented for 
several seconds, early viewing indicative of previous exposure followed by avoidance of target 
stimuli may be a potential indirect indicator of malingering. 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate a novel approach to measuring recognition 
deficits by comparing inconsistencies between explicit and implicit behavior on a memory task. 
The importance of eye movement effects cannot be overstated, as this methodology has shown 
that, even in amnesia, the eyes can indicate which stimuli have been previously seen (Althoff, 
Maciukenas, & Cohen, 1993; Althoff, 1998; Ryan et al., 2000). This is a type of old/new effect 
(Gardner, Mo, & Borrego, 1974), meaning that there is a differential reaction depending on the 
novelty of a presented stimulus. This, combined with the knowledge that familiar stimuli receive 
disproportionately more viewing shortly after display onset, allows for the development of a 
rough framework for expected outcomes.  
Eye movement methodology has shown to be a reliable way to study memory processes, 
but also has the potential to be a powerful tool in applied settings (Hannula et al., 2010a; 
Hannula, Baym, Warren, & Cohen, 2012). Both a true amnesic individual and one who is 
malingering a memory deficit are expected to provide explicit denials of memory for a studied 
stimulus, but their implicit behaviors should allow for them to be distinguished from each other. 
If using a relational memory task, the amnesic individual would not exhibit disproportionate 
viewing for manipulated scenes. Although the majority of the foundational research presented 
here involves relational memory, it is recognition memory that is most often evaluated in 
neuropsychological assessments. Therefore, investigating the discrepancy between explicit and 
implicit performance on a recognition task would provide additional support for the use of 
eyetracking as a means of indexing memory effects. 
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Because the majority of malingering detection occurs in the context of recognition 
memory tests, a measure or technique that evaluates memory without the need for explicit 
responding would be an attractive option for clinicians looking to better distinguish patients with 
legitimate memory complaints from those that are malingering. Despite the majority of this 
research being on relational memory, some effects are expected to carry over. For example, 
although amnesics would likely view novel objects for longer than familiar ones overall 
(repetition effect), they would not exhibit disproportionately greater viewing of familiar objects. 
Malingerers would be expected to have an early disproportionate viewing effect, which could 
then be compared to their explicit responses, foiling their attempts to feign impairment. Using 
recognition rather than relational memory allows the experimental task to be less time-
consuming and somewhat easier, as the relational paradigms often use complex scenes or scenes 
paired with faces. Overall, this project is an effort to employ an experimental methodology in an 
applied context in order to determine its utility in a clinical setting. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Controls will perform significantly better than simulators on the 
behavioral accuracy measure during both the test and posttest phases. 
Hypothesis 2: Simulators will perform significantly above chance on the behavioral 
accuracy measure during the test phase. 
For the test phase, when simulators will be actively faking memory impairment, control 
participants are expected to achieve higher accuracy scores. Additionally, because simulators 
will receive only minimal coaching and will be warned against obviously poor performance, it is 
also expected that their average accuracy will be significantly above a chance level of 50%. In 
the posttest phase, however, simulators will no longer be faking impairment and could 
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potentially exhibit improved performance on the task. However, some interference from the 
experimental instructions is expected to prevent them from achieving performance equal to that 
of controls. This interference may occur during encoding (i.e., poor learning during the study 
phase) and/or retrieval (i.e., providing incorrect responses during the test phase). Control 
participants were likely to perform equally well in both phases due to the absence of an incentive 
to perform poorly. 
Hypothesis 3: Controls will demonstrate significantly greater discriminability (d’) than 
simulators during the test and posttest phases. 
In addition to accuracy, it is useful to know if one group is more likely to engage in errors 
than the other. The discriminability index (d’) is a statistic used in signal detection research to 
determine sensitivity. Simulators would necessarily need to make errors on either target-present 
trials, target-absent trials, or both to further their cause of exhibiting memory impairment. 
Therefore, the signal and noise distributions for simulators should have greater overlap than 
those for controls. 
Hypothesis 4: Simulators and controls will spend significantly more time viewing studied 
stimuli over the course of the trial in target-present trials than non-studied critical items in 
target-absent trials in test and posttest phases. 
Hypothesis 5: Disproportionately greater viewing of studied stimuli on target-present 
trials for simulators and controls will emerge 0-1000 ms and 500-750 ms following display onset 
using the 1000 ms and 250 ms levels of analyses, respectively. 
The 500-750 ms time bin has been previously identified as the earliest that a within-
groups difference emerges between viewing time direct to critical objects in target-present and 
target-absent trials (Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007). This difference emerged early and 
21 
 
was seen throughout the course of the trial. Therefore, it is expected that the same pattern of 
results should emerge in the 0-1000 ms and 500-750 ms time bins, using the 1000 ms and 250 
ms levels of analysis, respectively. Investigating both levels of analysis will help determine if a 
more fine-grained approach provides more useful data, as opposed to simply more specific data. 
Methods 
Participants 
 A sample of 53 undergraduate students from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee was 
recruited through an online department subject pool (SONA). Participants without normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision (i.e., contact lenses, surgery) were excluded from the study. Although 
glasses do fall under the “corrected-to-normal” vision category, wearing them decreases the 
eyetracker’s ability to reliably track eye position. Five participants were excluded from the study 
due to having an inadequate number of valid trials further described in the analysis of eye 
movement data. All participants were compensated with course credit.  
The sample consisted of 38 females (79.2%) and 10 males (20.8%). The average age of 
participants was 22.125 years (SD = 5.63), while the median age was 21 years. The sample’s 
race/ethnicity distribution was as follows: 66.7% Caucasian (n = 32), 12.5% African American 
(n = 6), 10.4% Asian (n = 5), 6.25% Latino/a (n = 3), 2.08% Native American or Alaska Native 
(n = 1), and 2.08% declined to answer (n = 1). Forty-two participants were right-handed, five 
were left-handed, and one was ambidextrous. 
Materials 
Equipment. Visual stimuli were presented using Neurobehavioral Systems Presentation 
experiment software running on a Windows-based computer and color monitor. This same 
computer also recorded behavioral responses and response time. Eye position and gaze duration 
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was obtained using an ASL D6 desktop eyetracking system sampling at 60 Hz. The eyetracker 
was controlled using proprietary software developed by ASL on a second Windows-based 
computer. Behavioral responses were obtained through a keyboard-like game controller intended 
for use with a single hand with number labels on three buttons. 
Stimuli. For this experiment, 144 images were obtained from a standardized set of 
stimuli designed for research purposes (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). The stimuli are images 
of commonly-used nouns and include things such as animals, food, man-made tools, buildings, 
and widely-recognized symbols (e.g., heart). The original unedited stimuli were black line 
drawings on a white background and were meant to be projected onto a screen. Bitmap files of 
these images were obtained for this study. The size of each of the 144 images was increased from 
150 by 150 pixels to 280 by 280 pixels to increase their visibility. 
Each image was categorized as belonging to one of three distinct categories: a) organic 
(i.e., animals, plants, food, body parts), b) large inanimate objects (e.g., buildings, vehicles), or c) 
small inanimate objects most often manipulated using the hands (e.g., tools, clothing, jewelry, 
etc.). These categories were selected so that each would have roughly equal membership. Images 
from each category were randomly assigned to one of six 24-item lists with equal contribution 
from each of the three stimulus categories. One list served as the study list (e.g., A), in that 
participants were asked to view and remember those images in the study phase. These stimuli 
served as critical objects for target-present trials. Two lists (e.g., B and C) served as distractors 
for the study list in target-present trials. Target-present trials are those in which a previously-
studied stimulus exists, for the purpose of testing an individual’s memory. The remaining three 
lists (e.g., D, E, and F) served as stimuli in target-absent trials. Stimuli from one of these 
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remaining lists were used as critical objects in target-absent trials. Lists of images and their 
categories are provided in Appendix A.  
Using a separate set of stimuli for target-absent trials ensures that there is no memory 
overlap between target-present and target-absent trials. For example: if a distractor from a target-
present trial is then reused in a subsequent target-absent trial, this may lead to a “present” 
response rather than the correct “absent” response. Even though participants are instructed to 
only respond “present” on trials that have studied stimuli, the familiarity of reused stimuli may 
lead to unintended errors. Additionally, reusing a stimulus in a target-absent trial would be 
detrimental to the study design. A novel stimulus presented alongside two other novel stimuli is 
expected to receive approximately 33% of the viewing time for the trial. A previously viewed 
stimulus, even if originally presented alongside a more salient stimulus (i.e., a stimulus from the 
study phase), would likely have a viewing time advantage over a completely novel stimulus 
when presented in a target-absent trial. This advantage defeats the purpose of having target-
absent trials, which are meant to serve as baselines with which target-present trial data can be 
compared. Such a confound could confuse participants that are attempting to follow directions, 
but would also likely obscure statistical differences both between and within participants.  
Stimuli within each list also had an equal likelihood of appearing on one of the three 
locations in the test displays. Lists were counterbalanced across participants such that stimuli 
from each list had an equal likelihood of being studied. For example, participant 1 would study 
stimuli from list A, have list B and C stimuli appear as distractors in target-present trials, and 
have list D, E, and F stimuli appear in target-absent trials. Participant 2 would study list B 
stimuli, have list C and A stimuli as distractors in target-present trials, and have list E, D, and F 
stimuli in target-absent trials. For participant 2, list E serves as the critical object list for target-
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absent trials, whereas list D would serve that function for participant 1. Participant 4, however, 
would study list D, have lists E and F as distractors, and have lists A, B, and C as target-absent 
stimuli. Participants 5 and 6 would cycle through the lists in the same way. A complete diagram 
of stimulus counterbalancing is available in Appendix B. Trial order was randomized for each 
participant. The locations of critical objects in displays were also randomized to reduce the 
probability of guessing the correct answer.  
As luminance changes contribute to ocular reflexes (Porter et al., 2010; Porter & 
Troscianko, 2003), the goal was to minimize the luminance differential while still maintaining 
good visibility and allowing encoding to take place. Bitmap files are comprised of pixels, and as 
such, have luminance gradients at object edges. Changing luminance values in a bitmap file 
would produce noticeable and odd-looking luminance gradients that would significantly 
distinguish it from its original version. Instead, a freeware vector editor, Inkscape 0.48.4, was 
used to convert each image into a vectorized line drawing, change its luminance and that of the 
background, and then convert it back into a bitmap file. The luminance of the background was 
set at 75 cd/m2, while that of the object was set at 40 cd/m2. This procedure allowed the 
foreground and background luminances to be altered independently and minimized the extent of 
the luminance gradient. This procedure was also partially adapted from Porter et al. (2010), who 
used values of 75.2 cd/m2 and 63.6 cd/m2 for background and foreground, respectively. As the 
Porter study featured a feature search task in which the stimuli were visually identical but were 
oriented in different directions, the low contrast in that study was necessary to encourage search 
behavior and prevent pop-out effects, as well as to minimize pupillary reflexes (Porter & 
Troscianko, 2003). In the present study, such low contrast could potentially interfere with proper 
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encoding of stimuli in the study phase, as well as recognition and decision making in the test and 
posttest phases. Therefore, the contrast was increased slightly to facilitate improved viewing. 
Procedure 
Descriptions of the experiment, the equipment involved in the procedure, and any risks 
associated with participation were provided to the participants by a research assistant before 
obtaining informed consent. After obtaining informed consent, a research assistant randomly 
assigned participants to the control or simulator condition and read the appropriate instructions. 
Participants assigned to the control condition were instructed to perform their best on a memory 
test. Participants assigned to the simulator condition were provided with a vignette and asked to 
imagine that the situation in the vignette had happened to them. The vignette describes a car 
crash scenario after which the participant had a concussion, was taken to the hospital, and did not 
have any impairment. However, the vignette states that the participant has decided to fake 
memory impairment in order to receive a larger settlement from legal proceedings against the 
driver who caused the car accident. The participant was instructed that they would take a test to 
determine if they have impairment, and that they will receive no settlement if they were caught 
faking. The full text of the vignette is provided in Appendix C.  
Simulators were provided with minimal coaching. They were instructed to respond to 
every display, and to not always respond incorrectly; engaging in either of these two behaviors 
would make the evaluator suspicious of their performance. Following this, the simulators were 
asked to explain the objective in their own words to ensure comprehension. The participant was 
then allowed to ask questions about the objective before the evaluator entered the room, but not 
after. Research assistants were instructed to only provide further explanation of already provided 
instructions, but not to provide any additional instructions, constraints, or demand characteristics. 
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Essentially, simulators were free to manipulate their performance in any way they saw fit to 
complete the objective. While they were free to not respond to some items or provide only 
incorrect responses, it was ensured that they understood that engaging in these strategies would 
actually make it more likely to be detected. Simulator preparation instructions were significantly 
longer than that of controls, and could reveal a participant’s group assignment to the 
experimenter. To avoid this, research assistants were instructed to ask control participants 
general questions about their coursework for several minutes.  
 The evaluator then entered the room and measured the distance between the participant’s 
eye and a computer screen directly in front of them. The ideal distance for the eye behavior 
recording with this equipment is 24 inches. Participants were instructed to sit in a comfortable 
position in which they believed they could sit still without making large or unnecessary 
movements. Following this, the eyetracking software was used to track the participant’s head. 
This feature eliminated the need for a chinrest and provided for a less intrusive and more 
ecologically valid experience. Calibration was accomplished by presenting a 3 by 3 spatial array 
with letters on the screen. The participant was asked to look directly at the middle of each letter, 
which would allow the software to obtain reference points to be used in mapping that 
individual’s eye movements in two-dimensional space. 
 The evaluator described the study phase and instructed the participant to study the images 
in preparation for a subsequent memory test. A PowerPoint slide was displayed that showed 
what the display will look like, with the evaluator explaining the process one more time. 
Participants were then instructed to remain as still as possible and to not look away from the 
screen. The study phase involves showing a full sequence of 24 pictures, followed by the same 
24 pictures in a new randomized order, for a total of 48 trials. Stimuli were presented 
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individually for 3000 ms each, for a total of 6000 ms of exposure to each studied item. To ensure 
that participants were viewing the images, a fixation cross would appear on the screen for a 
minimum of 1000 ms. Once the evaluator saw that the participant’s gaze is centered on the 
fixation cross, the evaluator manually triggered the trial to begin.  
Once the study phase was complete, participants were shown a second PowerPoint slide 
that demonstrated the test displays with the evaluator providing instructions on how to respond. 
In the test phase, participants were shown 48 three-item displays. An illustration of sample 
displays and task progression is provided in Figure 1. Each display has one item in the upper left 
region, one item in the upper right region, and one item in the lower center region. Half of the 
displays contain only novel stimuli that have not been shown in the study phase (target-absent 
displays). The remaining displays contain one studied image (critical item) and two novel images 
(distractors) and will be referred to as target-present displays. The fixation cross procedure 
between trials, as described for the study phase, was also used for the test and post-test phases. 
The three-item displays were presented for 6000 ms each, followed by an intertrial interval of 
10000 ms where only a blank screen was displayed. The length of the intertrial interval was 
selected to allow for a rest period from studying the stimuli, as well as to allow ocular reflexes, 
such as pupillary diameter, to return to baseline before presenting the next set of stimuli (Porter 
et al., 2010). Participants responded with their dominant hand using a keyboard-like game 
controller. If a three-item display contained a familiar picture (i.e., an image presented during the 
study phase) participants were to press the ‘1’ key, otherwise, they were to press the ‘2’ key. 
Trials were experimenter-initiated based on verification of central fixation. 
Once the test phase was complete, a display detailing the posttest phase was shown and 
the evaluator provided additional instructions. Before anything about the task content was 
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revealed, the evaluator instructed the participant to do their best on the task, regardless of 
whether they were previously instructed to simulate memory impairment. Because the evaluator 
was blind to group assignment, this instruction was given to all participants. This manipulation 
was used to determine if simulators actually learned the stimuli during the study phase and 
volitionally adjusted their performance in the test phase. In other words, if they truly learned the 
stimuli, they should be able to perform well in the posttest phase. 
Here, participants viewed the three-item displays identical to those they saw in the test 
phase, but in a re-randomized order. The displays were also shown for 6000 ms, with a 10000 ms 
intertrial interval and a fixation cross procedure of at least 1000 ms. In contrast to the test phase, 
the posttest phase involved slightly more involvement from the participants. For each display, 
participants would first use the keyboard-like game controller to provide the locations of studied 
items. If a studied item appeared in the upper left region, they were to press the ‘1’ key. Studied 
items located in the upper right and lower center regions were assigned the ‘2’ and ‘3’ keys, 
respectively. If a studied item was not present, participants were instructed to press any of the 
three keys as soon as they have identified the absence of a studied item in the display. Once the 
display was removed from the screen and the intertrial interval had begun, the participant would 
provide a yes/no verbal response. This response refers to whether they believe a studied item was 
in the display they just saw. This allowed for the backsorting of button responses in this phase to 
determine reaction times for target–present and –absent trials. Verbal responses were recorded 
by the research assistant on a separate form. 
After the posttest phase is finished, participants completed an exit questionnaire about 
objectives, effort, motivation, confidence, and strategies. This questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix E. Once the participant completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed by the 
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evaluator and/or research assistant and could ask questions about the study. Barring any major 
technical issues, completing all parts of the study protocol took approximately 60 minutes. 
Analyses 
Behavioral Data 
Behavioral responses from the Presentation software were first compared against a list of 
known correct responses. A standard signal detection paradigm was used: a target-present trial 
that received a “present” response was marked as a hit, while an “absent” response was marked 
as a miss. For target-absent trials, a “present” response was counted as a false alarm, while an 
“absent” response was marked as a correct rejection. Corrected recognition score was the sole 
behavioral accuracy measure in the study. This is calculated by summing a participant’s hit and 
correct rejection rates, and then dividing by two. This adjustment better accounts for the 
occurrence of false alarms in a response set.  
In the event that a participant provided two different responses on a single trial, 
behavioral data from that trial was excluded from analysis. It was speculated that using those 
trials would not be a reliable measure of their true response; an input error may be caused by 
carelessness, and a response change may be the result of a participant trying to change a correct 
answer to an incorrect one to appear more impaired. It may also potentially reflect decreased 
confidence in their own responses or an inability to properly follow the task directions. Because 
the simulator’s goal is to not arouse suspicion, a high incidence of changing answers would 
likely work against them in a genuine incentive-seeking situation. 
Behavioral accuracy was evaluated using a two-way mixed model ANOVA using 
corrected recognition as the dependent variable. Both between-group (i.e., controls vs. 
simulators) and within-group (i.e., test vs. posttest) performance were compared. Simulator 
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performance was also evaluated to determine the success of the experimental manipulation. 
Above-chance performance for simulators was evaluated using binomial one-sample t-tests for 
the test and posttest phases separately. Performance at chance level on both phases would yield 
an accuracy score of 50%. This calculation will determine if simulators, as a group, effectively 
manipulated their performance in accordance with experimental instructions to not make their 
deception obvious to the experimenter.  
D’ is calculated as the difference in z-scores between a participant’s hit rate and false 
alarm rate. In signal detection theory, it is the distance between the peaks of the signal and noise 
distributions. Higher values of d’ indicate a greater ability to correctly identify studied stimuli. A 
two-way mixed model ANOVA was performed to compare d’ scores between simulators and 
controls for the test and posttest phases. 
Eye Movement Data 
 Recent relational memory eyetracking research using a similar paradigm has shown a 
pattern of greater viewing to be directed at familiar stimuli than novel stimuli emerging shortly 
after display onset (500-750ms) and continuing throughout the duration of the trial (Hannula et 
al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007). Although this study investigated recognition item memory, this 
early viewing effect was also expected to occur. Because this study also dealt with deception, the 
above hypothesis will need to be unpacked to some extent. Participants should spend more time 
viewing familiar stimuli, regardless of whether they provide a correct (hit) or incorrect (miss) 
behavioral response on target-present trials. On target-absent trials, all stimuli are novel and none 
should receive significantly more viewing than the others in a three-item display.  
For test and posttest phase trials, three regions of interest were identified on the stimulus 
displays: left, right, and bottom. Raw output was processed by an algorithm that groups samples 
31 
 
collected at 60 Hz into fixations. A fixation is defined as when eye position is maintained within 
0.5 degrees of viewing across at least six consecutive samples. Using this algorithm, a fixation is 
considered complete if two consecutive samples differed by at least one degree of viewing angle. 
A second algorithm was used to separate the data into 1000ms time bins (i.e., 0-1000ms, 1000-
2000ms, etc.). A separate procedure was used to apply a similar algorithm to separate the data 
into 250ms time bins (i.e., 0-250ms, 250-500ms, etc.) for a deeper level of analysis. Evaluating 
data at the 250 ms level allows for more specific temporal detection of viewing effects, at the 
cost of increasing the number of data to be analyzed. 
Viewing times for critical objects were isolated and calculated both across trials and 
within each time bin. Following this, proportions of viewing time were calculated to facilitate 
comparison across trials, as not all trials had the same amount of viewing time. Although trials 
are 6000 ms in length, given the size of the screen and the dimensions of each of the three 
regions of interest, it is unlikely that all of the 6000 ms were spent viewing the three regions by 
each participant. Trials with less than 65% (3900 ms) of the trial time spent viewing the three 
regions of interest was excluded from eye data analysis. 
For this study, eye movement data analysis required a minimum of four trials per signal 
detection category for an adequate sample of viewing time. As there is no learned stimulus to 
detect in target-absent trials, false alarm and correct rejection trial data was collapsed into a 
single “target-absent” category. Therefore, to be retained for analysis, simulators needed a 
minimum of four hits, four misses, and four target-absent trials based on the viewing time 
criterion established above. Because controls were not specifically instructed to provide incorrect 
answers on some trials, and were actually encouraged to do their best, it was not expected that a 
minimum of four miss trials would be obtained from each control participant. Therefore, controls 
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only needed four hits and four target-absent trials with adequate viewing time to be retained for 
analysis.  
Using this approach, five participants (3 simulators, 2 controls) were excluded from the 
sample, resulting in a final sample size of 48. From this final sample, 543 of the 2304 total trials 
(23.57%) were rejected using the viewing time criterion. Determining if one of the groups is 
significantly more likely to spend less time viewing the stimuli overall would be of interest. A 
significant difference in rejected trials between groups could indicate a simulation strategy or 
decreased effort expended over the course of the task. However, it could also indicate difficulties 
in obtaining reliable eyetracking data, as there are multiple reasons why a trial could be rejected. 
Therefore, a direct statistical comparison of rejected trials would not be appropriate. 
All eye movement data of a particular type (e.g., hit, target-absent) and time bin (e.g., 0-
250 ms, 1000-2000 ms) was first averaged within-participants, then between-participants by 
group. A mixed model ANOVA was used to identify significant differences in proportion of 
viewing time between simulators and controls, and within groups by trial type (i.e., target-
present and target-absent) at the trial level. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA evaluated 
within-group differences using three trial types (i.e., hit, miss, and target-absent) at the trial level 
for simulators only. The goal of the second analysis was to identify differences between hit and 
miss trials, as the miss trials are critical for the identification of simulators. Partial eta-squared 
(η2) was used as a measure of effect size. Commonly accepted interpretations for this statistic are 
.01 (small), .06 (medium), and .14 (large). For data obtained from 1000 ms and 250 ms time 
bins, focused mixed model repeated measures ANOVAs, as well as two-tailed independent and 
dependent t-tests were used to compare the proportion of viewing time between groups and 
within groups by trial type (i.e., hit, miss, target-absent), as appropriate.  
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Secondary Analyses 
To evaluate the utility of each of these measures as a tool for detecting feigned memory 
impairment, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was employed. ROC curves plot 
the true positive rate and false positive rates for various cutoff scores on a particular variable. 
Traditionally, the true positive rate is termed sensitivity, while the false positive rate is displayed 
as one minus specificity. For the purposes of this study, the ROC plot provides a visual 
representation of how many participants are correctly classified into their experimentally 
assigned groups on a given measure using a variety of cutoff scores. In fact, as sensitivity 
increases, specificity tends to decrease, leading to the difficult decision of deciding on an 
appropriate cutoff score.  
Test developers seek to maximize both of these properties, but it is highly unlikely that a 
psychometrically perfect measure exists or will be developed. Therefore, instruments designed 
for clinical use should have sufficiently high sensitivity and specificity to justify their use in 
settings outside of research. Practically, a measure or technique should have at least 0.80 on both 
of these indices. However, in the case of malingering, clinicians are more interested in correctly 
identifying those who put forth good effort, suggesting that a specificity of at least .90 is more 
desirable.  
In order for the cutoff scores to be useful, the test or variable itself must be useful. The 
ROC analysis provides a measure of this by calculating the area under the ROC curve (AUC). 
An AUC of 0.5 represents a test whose true positive and false positive rates are equal, suggesting 
that it is functionally worthless. Generally, the greater the AUC, the better the test is at being a 
diagnostic instrument due to its higher sensitivity and specificity values. Tests yielding AUCs 
under 0.5 should be avoided at all costs. 
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ROC curves were plotted for a variety of behavioral and eye movement measures to 
identify useful clinical indicators of malingering. Because performance on the behavioral 
accuracy measure produces only one score per participant in the test phase, a single ROC 
analysis was conducted using behavioral data. For eye movement data, two sets of ROCs were 
plotted. The first set includes 31 separate ROC curves: one for each of six 1000ms time bins, 24 
250ms time bins, and one for collapsed trial-level data from the test phase. The test variable for 
these 31 ROCs is the proportion of viewing time directed to the studied item in target-present test 
phase trials. The second set of eye movement ROCs was identical to the first, save for the test 
variable. Here, a difference score was calculated using the proportion of viewing time directed to 
studied items between correct (hit) and incorrect (miss) target-present trials. As controls are 
unlikely to have many incorrect trials individually, an average of all control miss trials for this 
variable was used for this calculation instead.  
Each represents an index that could potentially be used for clinical practice, and 
combinations of multiple such variables could create an even more powerful index. For this 
study, only one test variable was selected for each type of data because they represent the most 
useful individual indices of memory in research settings. The identification of a multimethod 
index is time-consuming and somewhat beyond the scope of this study. Due to the importance of 
such information, however, an attempt to create such an index will be made using available 
variables that demonstrate good diagnostic utility. 
Results 
Behavioral Data 
The 2 (controls vs. simulators) x 2 (test vs. posttest) two-way mixed model ANOVA 
compared corrected recognition scores. There was a main effect of group, F(1,46) = 123.778, p < 
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.001, partial η2 = .729, as well as a main effect of time, F(1,46) = 32.317, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.413. There was also a significant interaction effect, F(1,46) = 48.432, p < .001, partial η2 = .513.  
Post-hoc two-tailed independent t-test comparisons revealed that controls (95.69%) 
performed significantly better than simulators (61.39%) in the test phase, t(46) = 12.482, p < 
.001. Controls (93.58%) also significantly outperformed simulators (82.38%) in the posttest 
phase, t(46) = 4.454, p < .001. However, post-hoc two-tailed dependent t-test comparisons 
showed that simulators were able to significantly improve their performance in the posttest phase 
when compared to the test phase, t(23) = 6.524, p < .001. Interestingly, controls evidenced a 
small, but significant decrease in performance from the test phase to the posttest phase, t(23) = -
2.582, p < .05. Because controls performed significantly better than controls on the behavioral 
task in both phases, these results fully support Hypothesis #1. 
Additionally, the binomial one-sample two-tailed t-tests found that simulators performed 
significantly above chance level (>50%) on the test phase, t(23) = 4.433, p <.001, and on the 
posttest phase, t(23) = 14.809, p < .001. Therefore, simulators successfully manipulated their 
performance by making a notable amount of errors, but not so many as to appear to be at or 
below chance, which supports Hypothesis #2. 
A separate 2 (controls vs. simulators) x 2 (test vs. posttest) two-way mixed model 
ANOVA was used to compare discriminability index (d’) scores. There was a main effect of 
group, F(1,46) = 104.539, p < .001, partial η2 = .694, as well as a main effect of time, F(1,46) = 
20.654, p < .001, partial η2 = .310. There was also a significant interaction effect, F(1,46) = 
46.183, p < .001, partial η2 = .501. 
Post-hoc two-tailed independent t-test comparisons revealed that controls (d’ = 3.71) had 
better discriminability than simulators (d’ = 0.66) in the test phase, t(46) = 13.910, p < .001. 
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Controls (d’ = 3.41) also had greater discriminability than simulators (d’ = 2.20) in the posttest 
phase, t(46) = 4.362, p < .001. Post-hoc two-tailed dependent t-test comparisons showed that 
simulators significantly improved their discriminability in the posttest phase, t(23) = 6.548, p < 
.001. Controls evidenced a small, but significant decrease in discriminability from the test to the 
posttest phase, t(23) = -2.251, p < .05. These results support Hypothesis #3. 
Eye Movement Data 
 Trial level analysis.  
Test phase. Proportions of viewing time for the test phase are presented in Table 1. The 2 
(controls vs. simulators) X 2 (Hit trials vs. Absent trials) mixed model ANOVA found that there 
was a significant main effect of Group, F(1,46) = 4.325, p = .043, partial η2 = .086. There was 
also a significant main effect of Trial type, F(1,46) = 103.818, p < .001, partial η2 = .693. The 
interaction was only marginally significant, F(1,46) = 3.811, p = .057, partial η2 = .077. A post-
hoc two-tailed independent t-test found a significant difference between controls and simulators 
on Hit trials (.560 vs. .483), t(46) = 2.143, p = .037. Post-hoc two-tailed dependent t-test 
comparisons found significant differences between Hit and Target-Absent trials within controls 
(.560 vs. .339), t(23) = 8.487, p < .001, as well as simulators (.483 vs. .333), t(23) = 5.894, p < 
.001. These results provide test phase support for Hypothesis #4.  
 As the simulator group had a greater number of Miss trials, a follow-up analysis of all 
trial types was completed in order to detect differences in viewing behavior between Hit and 
Miss trials. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA found significant within-subjects mean 
differences, F(2,46) = 17.065, p < .001, partial η2 = .426. Proportion of viewing time directed at 
the critical object was significantly different between Hit trials (.483) and Miss trials (.398), t(23) 
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= 3.188, p = .004. The mean difference between Miss trials and Absent trials (.333) was also 
significant, t(23) = 2.586, p = .017. 
 Given that each participant undergoes 48 trials in the test phase, each group collectively 
undergoes 1152 trials. Overall, controls had 318 rejected trials (27.6%), while simulators only 
had 225 (19.5%), for a total of 543. While it would seem more likely that simulators would have 
more rejected trials due to purposeful invalidation of trials through off-screen viewing or 
response issues, it was not expected that controls would actually have more rejected trials 
overall. 
 Posttest phase. The 2 (controls vs. simulators) X 2 (Hit trials vs. Absent trials) mixed 
model ANOVA found that there was no main effect of Group, F(1,45) = 1.088, p = .303, partial 
η2 = .024. There was a significant main effect of Trial type, F(1,45) = 234.237, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .839. The Group X Trial type interaction was not significant, F(1,45) = .336, p = .565, 
partial η2 = .007. Post-hoc two-tailed dependent t-test comparisons found greater viewing 
directed at critical objects during Hit trials for controls (.597 vs. .339), t(22) = 12.556, p < .001, 
as well as simulators (.566 vs. .326), t(23) = 9.579, p < .001. These results support Hypothesis 
#4. Additionally, a two-tailed independent t-test found no significant difference between controls 
and simulators on Hit trials, t(45) = 0.950, p = .347. One control participant had insufficient valid 
Hit trials due to poor tracking, resulting in that data point being entered as missing data for these 
analyses. 
 While collapsed trial level data provides important information about overall differences 
between group trial types, it does not reveal when significant differences occur. Because 
attention is a continuous phenomenon, we looked to the 1000 ms and 250 ms levels of analysis to 
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determine whether the groups demonstrate implicit recognition at the same time and whether 
they exhibit differing patterns of viewing behavior throughout the trial. 
 Time course analysis at the 1000 ms level. The full time course is presented graphically 
in Figure 2. Data regarding the proportions of viewing time for the test phase are presented in 
Table 1. A 2 (controls vs. simulators) X 2 (Hit trials vs. Absent trials) X 6 (six 1000 ms timebins) 
mixed models ANOVA was performed. There was a significant main effect of Group, F(1,46) = 
4.962, p = .031, partial η2 = .097. More significant was the main effect of Trial type, F(1,46) = 
106.052, p < .001, partial η2 = .697. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the independent 
variable of Time had violated the assumption of sphericity, χ2(14) = 29.762, p = .008. Utilizing 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, there was a main effect of Time, F(3.919,180.269) = 2.870, p = 
.025, partial η2 = .059. The Trial type X Group interaction was marginally significant, F(1,46) = 
3.876, p = .055, partial η2 = .078. The Time X Group interaction was also marginally significant, 
F(5,230) = 1.964, p = .085, partial η2 = .041. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
Trial type X Time interaction had violated the assumption of sphericity, χ2(14) = 26.017, p = 
.026. Utilizing a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, this interaction was also significant, 
F(4.053,186.426) = 4.843, p < .001, partial η2 = .095. The three-way interaction was also 
significant, F(5,230) = 4.514, p < .001, partial η2 = .089. 
 A follow-up repeated measures ANOVA was performed using Hit, Miss, and Absent data 
from 1000 ms time bins from the simulator group alone. These results are presented graphically 
in Figure 3. There was a significant main effect of Trial type, F(2,46) = 17.819, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .437. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the sphericity assumption was violated for 
Time, χ2(14) = 25.339, p = .032, and the Trial type X Time interaction, χ2(54) = 96.166, p < .001. 
Using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, there was a marginally significant main effect of Time, 
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F(3.560,81.876) = 2.451, p = .059, partial η2 = .096. The interaction was also significant 
following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F(5.888,135.427) = 2.671, p = .018, partial η2 = 
.104. 
 A series of two-tailed dependent t-tests were performed comparing proportion of viewing 
time to critical objects in Hit and Absent trials for the test phase. Both controls and simulators 
directed significantly greater viewing towards critical objects in Hit trials throughout all six 
timebins, all p < .01. Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the rate of family-wise error for 12 
comparisons, changing the significance criterion to p < .004167. Following this correction, 11 of 
the 12 comparisons remained significant, with the exception of controls in the 5000-6000 ms 
timebin (p = .0051). The significant difference in viewing time in the 0-1000 ms timebin for both 
groups supports Hypothesis #5.  
 A series of two-tailed independent t-tests were performed comparing controls and 
simulators on the proportion of viewing time to critical objects in Hit trials only. Controls 
directed greater viewing to critical items than simulators on Hit trials for the first half of the trial 
(0-3000 ms), all p < .05, but not during the timebins in the second half (3000-6000 ms), all p > 
.05. Bonferroni correction was used to adjust family-wise error for six comparisons, changing the 
significance criterion to p < .0083. Following this correction, only the differences for the 1000-
2000 ms (p = .0002) and the 2000-3000 ms (p = .002) timebins remained significant. 
 A series of two-tailed dependent t-tests were performed comparing proportion of viewing 
time to critical objects in Hit and Miss trials made by simulators. Simulators did not statistically 
differ in their viewing of critical objects during the first half of the trial, all p > .05. However, 
they directed significantly less viewing time to critical objects during Miss trials in the second 
half of the trial, all p < .05. Bonferroni correction was used to adjust family-wise error for six 
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comparisons, changing the significance criterion to p < .0083. Following this correction, only the 
differences for the 4000-5000 ms and 5000-6000 ms timebins remained significant, both p < .01. 
 Time course analysis at the 250 ms level. The full time course of the test phase is 
presented graphically in Figure 4. Data regarding the proportions of viewing time for the test 
phase are presented in Tables 2 and 3. A 2 (controls vs. simulators) X 2 (Hit trials vs. Absent 
trials) X 8 (eight 250 ms timebins) mixed models ANOVA was performed. From the 1000 ms 
analyses, it was clear that significant differences occurred within the first two seconds of the 
trial. Therefore, only the first eight timebins were evaluated here. There was a significant main 
effect of Group, F(1,37) = 7.278, p < .05, partial η2 = .164, as well as a significant main effect of 
Trial type, F(1,37) = 94.119, p < .001, partial η2 = .718. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated 
that the sphericity assumption was violated for Time, χ2(27) = 149.730, p < .001, and for the 
Trial type X Time interaction, χ2(27) = 159.634, p < .001. Using Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections, there was a significant main effect of Time, F(2.692,99.586) = 5.996, p < .002, 
partial η2 = .139, and a significant Trial type X Time interaction, F(2.894,107.063) = 2.930, p < 
.05, partial η2 = .073. The Group X Trial type and Group X Time interactions were also both 
significant, F(1,37) = 10.989, p = .002, partial η2 = .229 and F(7,259) = 3.618, p < .001, partial 
η2 =.089, respectively. The three-way interaction was also significant, F(7,259) = 3.686, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .091. 
Due to the large number of data points, even within this limited scope, performing all 
possible pairwise comparisons would greatly increase family-wise error rates. Therefore, only 
comparisons relevant to the hypotheses and the supported literature were completed (i.e., 
identifying the earliest timebin with statistically significant differences). Controls directed 
greater viewing at critical objects during Hit trials 500-750 ms following display onset, t(23) = 
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4.289, p < .001. Simulator data for the 500-750 ms timebin showed that they did not direct 
significantly more viewing time at critical objects, t(23) = 1.649, p = .11. They did, however, 
evidence significantly greater viewing in the 750-1000 ms timebin, t(23) = 3.217 , p < .01. When 
comparing the groups at the 500-750 ms timebin, it was found that controls had significantly 
greater viewing time than simulators, t(46) = 2.617, p < .05. 
 The full time course of the posttest phase is presented graphically in Figure 5. Data 
regarding the proportions of viewing time for the posttest phase are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
A 2 (controls vs. simulators) X 2 (Hit trials vs. Absent trials) X 8 (eight 250 ms timebins) mixed 
models ANOVA was performed. There was no significant difference between groups, F(1,32) = 
2.195, p = .148, partial η2 = .064. There was a significant main effect of Trial type, F(1,32) = 
144.876, p < .001, partial η2 = .819. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the sphericity 
assumption was violated for Time, χ2(27) = 119.705, p < .001, and for the Trial type X Time 
interaction, χ2(27) = 113.031, p < .001. Using Greenhouse-Geisser corrections, there was a 
significant main effect of Time, F(3.213,102.829) = 8.800, p < .001, partial η2 =.216, and a 
significant Trial type X Time interaction, F(3.530,112.952) = 7.945, p < .001, partial η2 = .199. 
The Group X Trial type interaction was statistically significant, F(1,320 = 7.995, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .200, but the Group X Time interaction was not, F(7,224) = .914, p = .496, partial η2 =.028. 
The three-way interaction was also not statistically significant, F(7,224) = 1.362, p = .223, 
partial η2 = .041. 
Similarly to the approach taken to test phase data, only relevant pairwise comparisons 
were performed. For the 500-750 ms timebin, controls and simulators both directed greater 
viewing at critical objects in Hit trials than in Absent trials, t(23) = 3.414, p < .01 and t(23) = 
3.811, p < .001, respectively. To determine if there was an early between-group difference for 
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Hit trials, pairwise comparisons were conducted using four consecutive timebins that include 
when early-trial effects occurred in the test phase: 500-750, 750-1000, 1000-1250, and 1250-
1500 ms. The greatest mean difference occurred at the 750-1000 ms timebin with controls 
having greater viewing time, but this difference was only marginally significant, t(46) = 1.909, p 
= .0625. The remaining three comparisons were not significant, p > .05, and all four comparisons 
were not significant following Bonferroni correction for four comparisons.  
Secondary Analyses 
 Hit-Miss difference calculation. While simulators are expected to make errors on target-
present trials that translate into Misses, controls performed at their best and were not expected to 
have many Miss trials. Only 20 Miss trials were collectively made by controls. Proportion of 
viewing time directed at critical objects in these trials was averaged together by level of analysis 
(i.e., trial, 1000 ms, 250 ms). To calculate the Hit-Miss difference, the appropriate Miss data 
point was subtracted from a control participant’s Hit data point for that level of analysis. Miss 
trial and Hit-Miss difference scores are presented in Table 6 for trial and 1000 ms data and in 
Tables 7 and 8 for 250 ms data. 
Behavioral ROC data. Corrected recognition scores for both groups were entered into a 
ROC analysis to determine the diagnostic utility of this measure. The ROC curve is presented in 
Figure 6. The analysis revealed that corrected recognition score is a near-perfect diagnostic 
variable, AUC = .998, p < .001. Using a cutoff score of 80.2% yields a sensitivity of .958 and a 
specificity of 1.0. A cutoff of 84.1% will instead produce a sensitivity of 1.0 and a specificity of 
.9583. 
 Trial level data. Separate ROC analyses were performed for the proportion of viewing 
time directed at critical objects during Hit trials and the calculated difference in proportion of 
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viewing time directed at critical objects between Hit and Miss trials. For Hit data, lower values 
were specified to be more indicative of simulator status, whereas greater values were to be more 
indicative when using the Hit-Miss difference. The associated ROC curves are presented in 
Figures 7 and 8, respectively. Tables 9 and 10 provide AUC data and selected cutoff scores for 
the two curves. The analysis revealed that viewing time during Hit trials is a marginally 
significant diagnostic variable, AUC = .660, p = .058. Having perfect specificity would mean 
lowering sensitivity to .125, which is unadvisable. Decreasing specificity to .958 would boost 
sensitivity to .333. The Hit-Miss difference score appears to be a more significant diagnostic 
variable, AUC = .767, p < .01. A sensitivity of .417 would yield a specificity of .917. Using a 
specificity of .958 provides a sensitivity of .208, suggesting that trial-level Hit data alone may be 
more useful at this specificity. 
 1000 ms level data. Six ROC analyses each were performed for Hit trial and Hit-Miss 
difference data at the 1000 ms level of analysis. Smaller values were specified as more indicative 
of simulator status for Hit data. The ROC curves for Hit data are presented in Figures 9 and 10, 
with associated ROC analysis statistics presented in Table 9. Of the six Hit data analyses, only 
three were significant. The 1000-2000 ms timebin was the most significant, AUC = .79, p < .001. 
The 2000-3000 ms timebin was the second most significant, AUC = .748, p < .01. The 0-1000 
ms timebin was the third most significant, AUC = .682, p < .05. Cutoff values presented in Table 
9 were selected based on a minimum specificity of 0.80. In addition to being the most 
statistically significant, the 1000-2000 ms timebin has the most useful cutoff values. By lowering 
the specificity to .833, a sensitivity of .667 can be achieved, which is higher than any other 
timebin in this analysis. The 2000-3000 ms timebin has three useable cutoffs, but only two have 
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a sensitivity of 0.5 and above. While the 0-1000 ms timebin has cutoffs with high specificity, 
sensitivity values are below 0.4, making them not as useful as cutoffs from other timebins. 
The ROC curves for Hit-Miss difference data are presented in Figures 12 and 13, with 
associated ROC analysis statistics presented in Table 10. For these analyses, greater values were 
specified to be more indicative of simulator status. Of the six analyses, four were statistically 
significant. The 5000-6000 ms timebin was the most significant, AUC = .901, p < .001. The 
3000-4000 ms timebin was second most significant, AUC = .816, p < .001. The 4000-5000 ms 
timebin was the third most significant, AUC = .811, p < .001. The fourth significant timebin was 
1000-2000 ms, p < .05, but its diagnostic value is highly questionable, AUC = .332. Cutoff 
values presented in Table 10 were selected based on a minimum specificity of 0.80. In addition 
to being the most statistically significant, the 5000-6000 ms timebin also has a cutoff value with 
sensitivity and specificity of .833, as well as another with a sensitivity of .625 and a specificity of 
.958. The 4000-5000 ms timebin also has two usable cutoff values with at least 0.8 specificity 
and sensitivity in the 0.7 range. Comparatively, the 3000-4000 ms timebin only has one useful 
cutoff; its specificity of .958 is high, but its sensitivity of .542 is somewhat lacking compared to 
cutoffs generated for the other timebins. 
 250 ms level data. Twenty-four ROC analyses each were performed for Hit trial and Hit-
Miss difference data from the test phase at the 250 ms level of analysis. Smaller values were 
specified as more indicative of simulator status for Hit data. The ROC curves for Hit data are 
presented in Figure 11, and associated ROC analysis statistics are provided in Table 11. Of the 
24 Hit data ROCs, 14 were not significant (p > .05), one was marginally significant (p = .07), 
and nine were significant (p < .05 or less). However, 14 of the 24 analyses (including four 
significant analyses) had at least one tie between positive and negative state variable groups and 
45 
 
may have yielded biased statistics, leading to their exclusion from further investigation. 
Therefore, only five timebins were evaluated further for diagnostic cutoff values and are the ones 
presented in Figure 11 and Table 11. The most statistically significant timebin was 1250-1500 
ms, AUC = .797, p < .001. The second most significant timebin was 1500-1750 ms, AUC = .757, 
p < .01. The third was 2500-2750 ms, AUC = .738, p < .01, the fourth was 750-1000 ms, AUC = 
.736, p < .01, and the fifth was 500-750 ms, AUC = .696, p < .05. The cutoff values generated by 
the ROC analyses for the 500-750 ms and 2500-2750 ms timebins both had sensitivity values 
below 0.4 at specificity values above 0.8. The 750-1000 ms timebin improved on that with a 
cutoff with sensitivity of .458 and a specificity of .875. The 1500-1750 ms timebin offered a 
sensitivity of .583 with a specificity of .833. The 1250-1500 ms, however, offered two of the best 
cutoffs: sensitivities of .708 and .667 and specificities of .875 and .917, respectively. 
 The ROC curves for Hit-Miss difference data are presented in Figures 14-16, with 
associated ROC analysis statistics presented in Table 12. For these analyses, greater values were 
specified to be more indicative of simulator status. Of the 24 Hit-Miss difference data ROCs, six 
were not significant (p > .05), three were marginally significant (.05 ≤ p ≤ .10), and 15 were 
significant (p < .05 or less). Three significant results and the three marginally significant 
analyses had AUCs below 0.5, suggesting no diagnostic utility and were excluded from further 
investigation. Only one timebin (0-250 ms) had at least one tie between positive and negative 
state variable groups and may have yielded biased statistics, but its analysis was not significant 
(p > .05) despite having an AUC above 0.5. Therefore, only those twelve timebins were 
evaluated further for diagnostic cutoff values and are the ones presented in Figures 14-16 and 
Table 12. The remaining twelve timebins had AUCs ranging from .727 (4500-4750 ms) to .939 
(5750-6000 ms). Interestingly, all twelve timebins collectively make up the second half of the 
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trial. Eleven of the twelve significant timebins have at least one useful cutoff score with a 
sensitivity above 0.5 and a specificity above 0.8. Three timebins (i.e., 4750-5000 ms, 5250-5500 
ms, and 5750-6000 ms) each have a cutoff value that boasts a sensitivity and specificity of 0.833. 
 Diagnostic classification. Using AUC as a criterion, the ROC analyses revealed a 
number of potentially useful diagnostic variables. Of the numerous available variables, seven in 
particular will be evaluated for their utility in classifying the participants in this sample. They 
include Corrected Recognition (CR), proportion of viewing time directed to critical objects 
during Hit trials at 1000-2000 ms and 1250-1500 ms, and difference in proportion of viewing 
time directed at critical objects between Hit and Miss trials at 5000-6000 ms, 5750-6000 ms, 
5250-5500 ms, and 4750-5000 ms. Each variable was evaluated using its selected cutoff values, 
as mentioned above for a total of 22 analyses. All relevant variable and diagnostic data is 
presented in Table 13. Corrected Recognition outperformed every other variable chosen for 
analysis with its sensitivity of .958 and specificity of 1.0. A variable with such high signal 
detection characteristics is incredibly rare, such that it only misclassified one of 48 cases (a 
simulator). Although it was not expected for the behavioral measure to be so effective, no test is 
inherently perfect. Therefore, it was of practical interest to find a second variable that could 
supplement Corrected Recognition to make a hypothetically perfect measure in this sample, at 
least. 
 False positive rate, or incorrectly labeling a control as a simulator (i.e., Type I error), is 
negatively tied to specificity and positive predictive value (PPV). On the other hand, false 
negative rate, or incorrectly labeling a simulator as a control (i.e., Type II error), is negatively 
tied to sensitivity and negative predictive value (NPV). While sensitivity and specificity are good 
test evaluation criteria, they are essentially probabilities of detecting a condition .The predictive 
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values, however, measure the likelihood that the test result matches the person’s actual condition 
state. For this reason, they are considered to be a more real-world examination of the test’s 
utility. For example, Corrected Recognition has a PPV of 1.0 and a NPV of .96, meaning that all 
cases classified as simulators were actually simulators (23 correct simulators and 0 incorrect 
controls), but that 96% of cases classified as controls were actually controls (24 correct controls, 
but one incorrect simulator).  
 Only 13 of 21 analyses were able to correctly identify the single case misclassified by the 
Corrected Recognition variable, all coming from five of the six remaining variables. When 
prioritizing PPV, however, the top three analyses were able to complete the sample. While all 
three had perfect PPV, their NPV ranged from .774 to .686. The analyses with the three highest 
NPVs in the sample were not able to complete the sample by correctly identifying the final 
simulator using their respective cutoffs. The next five analyses, however, were able to complete 
the sample. These analyses had NPVs ranging from .84 to .808 with PPVs ranging from .87 to 
.864, respectively. Technically, because the 13 analyses had correctly classified the final 
simulator case, any one of those variables (using those specific cutoffs) would add incremental 
utility to the task by boosting its sensitivity and specificity to 1.0. 
Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to determine if eye movement methodology had utility 
as a way to identify individuals who were feigning memory impairment. Modern psychological 
assessment approaches to the question of performance validity largely utilize memory tests and 
rely on explicit responding. Therefore, it was believed that an indirect measure of recognition 
could potentially detect malingerers as good as, or even better than, an explicit measure. In the 
present study, both explicit and implicit data were collected in an effort to compare the efficacy 
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of the two. However, as no single measure is psychometrically perfect both under control 
conditions and when applied to the rigors of real-world use, no great expectations were placed on 
any single measure.  
Although the simulator group performed at above-chance levels, not all individual 
simulators performed above 50%. Volitional maintenance of impaired performance is 
cognitively draining, such that actively keeping track of correct and incorrect responses is 
difficult when done alongside the study’s actual task. Therefore, not all simulators may have 
been able to actively adjust their performance on a trial-by-trial basis, whether effectively or not. 
The posttest questionnaire, presented in Appendix E, revealed that simulators engaged in a 
variety of behaviors that could potentially impact encoding, retrieval, or both. All options were 
endorsed at least once and simulators often endorsed multiple strategies. Therefore, it should be 
noted that not everyone tasked with manipulating their performance by adopting an impaired 
persona approached the task the same way. 
 All experimental hypotheses involving eye movement measures were supported by the 
available data. Significant differences were found in viewing time between critical objects in Hit 
and Absent trials at the trial level for both groups in the test phase. Simulators also showed 
differences in viewing time to critical objects between Hit, Miss, and Absent trials, suggesting a 
potential pattern of viewing behavior resulting from the experimental instructions. In the posttest 
phase, controls and simulators were not statistically distinguishable using trial-level eye 
movement data while maintaining differences between Hit and Absent trials that were previously 
established. This data provides evidence that the trial-level data from eye movements is 
somewhat sensitive to instructions to feign memory impairment. 
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The 1000 ms level of analysis provided additional information about when group 
differences might occur. Both groups directed greater viewing towards critical objects in Hit 
trials than in Absent trials for nearly the full duration of the trial, consistent with expectations. 
The earliest timebin to show this difference was 0-1000 ms, providing additional evidence that 
early-trial eye movements are sensitive to memory. Interestingly, simulators directed 
significantly less viewing to critical objects in Hit trials 1000-3000 ms following display onset. 
Additionally, simulators also had differences between critical object viewing for Hit and Miss 
trials 4000-6000 ms following display onset.  
Integrating this information suggests that simulators a) indirectly identify studied objects 
early in the trial, b) engage in “distributed viewing” (i.e., spending more time viewing other 
objects or looking off-screen) during the early stages of Hit trials, and c) engage in “distributed 
viewing” in the late stages of Miss trials. One interpretation of this phenomenon is that 
simulators are keeping the experimental instructions in mind (i.e., answer incorrectly sometimes) 
and that distributed viewing is a volitional strategy employed to make the impression that they 
have not found the studied object. However, because their indirect recognition is intact and 
occurs very early in the trial, their viewing patterns in the middle and late stages of the trial are 
actually quite telling of their motivations. The late-trial avoidance of studied objects in Miss 
trials may very well be a volitional manipulation meant to imply that they have visually 
identified a non-studied object as the studied one. This is remarkably similar to results reported 
for when participants are instructed to look away from famous faces, but end up directing greater 
early viewing to those faces first before avoiding them (Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007). Again, 
the early viewing effect allows for the identification of indirect recognition.  
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Essentially, these departures from expected behavior (when compared to controls) are 
compared to the individual’s explicit responses to determine how useful they are for group 
classification. However, instead of using a subtest score or an equation to detect malingering, 
this approach uses the body’s own systems to demonstrate which group it belongs to. Of course, 
the earlier an effect occurs in a trial, the more likely that the effect results from an obligatory 
process. But just because a more obligatory and likely less cognitively demanding process can be 
an index of indirect memory, it does not mean that a late-trial difference is useless. Some of the 
planned eye movement analyses focused on identifying the earliest timebin in which differences 
were detected. This information is useful experimentally to provide evidence for past research, 
but can also be used to justify the changing the task design.  
For example, the earliest significant differences were all detected within the first 1000 ms 
of the trial. From a utilitarian perspective and knowing only this information, it would be 
reasonable to reduce the trial length by at least 50% to enable faster administration. However, 
there is a wealth of useful information in the second half of the trial that provides insight about 
the more volitional processes at work during the task. Additionally, going beyond the trial-level 
data to the 1000 ms level provided useful information about group differences that are only 
visible through the lens of time. 
Going even further, the 250 ms analyses also provided additional evidence to support the 
earlier finding of the 500-750 ms timebin as the earliest point during a trial in which studied 
critical objects receive greater viewing, as long as participants are performing at their best. For 
simulators, the earliest timebin in which this difference occurred was 750-1000 ms. Although a 
difference of 250 ms may not have immediate practical significance, it has the potential to be a 
useful diagnostic measure. It should also be noted that the 0-250 ms timebin was not particularly 
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useful for analysis, as the data was highly variable both between and within-participants, or was 
missing due to eyetracker error. 
From a purely visual standpoint, the 250 ms time courses for controls and simulators in 
the test phase follow remarkably similar patterns. While the control Hit curve rises faster and 
maintains greater magnitude, the simulator curve also has a small decrease in Hit trial viewing 
during the 1750-2000 ms timebin. Also, the two Hit curves almost overlap during the second half 
of the trial. While simulator Miss data at the 250 ms level was not specifically examined, the 
1000 ms level data suggests a continued downward trend in viewing of studied critical objects. 
Together, this suggests that in the second half of target-present trials, simulators “behave” like 
controls when they provide a correct response, but noticeably avoid looking at the studied critical 
object when they provide an incorrect response.  
When observing the 250 ms level posttest time course, there is significantly more overlap 
between the control and simulator Hit curves. At this stage of the study, there was no need for 
simulators to continue adhering to the experimental instructions. Not only did their explicit 
recognition accuracy significantly increase, but their viewing behavior also became more 
control-like. This includes a temporal shift of the early viewing effect in simulators back to the 
500-750 ms timebin from where it was in the test phase. Although a marginally significant 
difference was detected between groups on Hit trials early in the trial (750-1000 ms), that 
difference was of the largest magnitude found in that time course. The function of the posttest 
phase was to determine if there were some lasting effects of the experimental instructions on 
viewing that persist, despite clear instructions to perform optimally. These results suggest that 
while there may be some influence, it is largely absent and may only be important statistically 
rather than practically. 
52 
 
 It was rather unexpected to see such near-perfect psychometrics from the sole behavioral 
variable, Corrected Recognition. At the same time, explicit recognition tests are fairly common 
and one of the most well-researched in psychological assessment. Most, if not all, aspects of the 
study design were geared towards drawing a clear distinction between performance arising from 
optimal and suboptimal effort. The set of visual stimuli (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) was 
chosen for its ease of identification (of individual stimuli) and were specifically adjusted so as to 
decrease distractibility (Porter & Troscianko, 2003; Porter et al., 2010). The car crash scenario 
presented to simulators appeared to result in a measurable change in behavior, as simulators were 
outperformed by controls, yet did not provide a completely noncredible performance at the group 
level. The manipulation persisted, as simulators were not able to raise their performance to match 
that of controls. This suggests that participants may have engaged in flawed learning leading to 
poor encoding of stimuli. Alternatively, the cognitive effort of following the simulator 
instructions during the test phase may have altered how the studied stimuli were re-processed 
and responded to during the posttest phase.  
No trial-level variables made for useful diagnostic indicators, which is unsurprising given 
the amount of information collected over 6000 ms compressed into a single data point. 
Regarding the remaining useful variables, based on ROC analyses, Hit-Miss difference scores 
appeared to do better than Hit-only data. This is not necessarily surprising, as late-trial Hit and 
Miss data at the 1000 ms level suggested that this may be the case. Also, more of the useful 
variables were from the 250 ms level rather than the 1000 ms level. The 1000 ms level subsumes 
just enough data points to yield significant differences, but is not as precise about when changes 
occur. Because significant differences occur early and rapidly, this suggests that more in-depth 
data analysis was warranted and is consistent with earlier research (Hannula et al., 2007). 
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Limitations 
It should be noted that this is an analog study; participants in the simulator group were 
instructed to behave differently so that it could be determined whether the measures were of any 
use diagnostically. While the task yielded several good and useful indicators of malingering, it is 
certainly possible that the experimental environment influenced participants to fulfill their roles 
either optimally or suboptimally. The apparent success of the Corrected Recognition variable is 
surprising, especially for an early task design. It is entirely possible that a larger and more 
representative sample may yield very good sensitivity and specificity, but not as high as those 
obtained in the present study. 
In a true malingering study, the task would be used with individuals who have a definite 
motivation to underperform and during the course of a standard evaluation. In such a study, the 
clinician would have to make a judgment about the individual’s group state (i.e., neurologically 
normal, impaired, or malingering). It would also be against the individual’s self-interest to reveal 
providing suboptimal effort in a situation where they stand to gain something. There would also 
be no group assignment document that could be referenced to check the accuracy of the 
clinician’s judgment after the fact. Therefore, analog studies should expect to obtain more 
impressive ROCs than studies using real cases. 
In order to make such an important decision, reference data would need to be collected 
from a variety of groups for the purpose of creating score profiles. In using reference groups in 
which members have clearly identified conditions, new cases would be compared to each group 
for best fit. The present study was a preliminary evaluation of the methodology’s potential in 
malingering detection. It is also significantly easier to recruit participants from a college 
population than neurologically impaired community members. At the same time, in order for a 
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test or indicator to even be considered viable, demonstrating proof of concept via an analog 
simulator study is a first step. 
The test phase involved reporting an explicit dichotomous decision about recognizing an 
object in the display. Had the test phase required specific identification of the studied object, 
similar to the posttest phase, an analysis of viewing time directed to the selected object would 
have been made. The combination of the early viewing effect for the studied object, as well as 
the match between greater late viewing and behavioral selection of an incorrect object via the 
response intention effect (Hannula et al., 2007) could have provided another powerful diagnostic 
variable. 
Looking to Ryan et al. (2007), several modifications to the task could have potentially 
improved it by allowing for more between-group comparisons. At different stages of the task, 
individuals would be asked to identify familiar objects, ignore familiar objects, or focus on novel 
objects with their eyes while measuring viewing time. Following this, recognition and recall 
tasks would be administered. Such a series of tasks could potentially be highly sensitive to 
feigned memory impairment, as malingerers would engage in normal viewing patterns during the 
viewing phases, but demonstrate a response intention effect during the test phases (Hannula et 
al., 2007). Such a mismatch between implicit and explicit behavior could also have great utility 
in clinical settings. 
Eyetracking equipment and methodology is still currently used almost exclusively in the 
experimental realm. Any methodology that hopes to match or exceed an industry “gold standard” 
requires extensive research and development before widespread use and availability. The 
methodology and applications used in this study are all highly experimental and will require 
further analysis and design alterations to perfect. At the present time, the time and financial costs 
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of using a diagnostic eyetracking task may outweigh its benefits. If eyetracking can be shown to 
be as useful a methodology clinically as it is experimentally, more financially accessible models 
may be developed in the future. For optimal ease of use, the equipment should be as unintrusive 
as possible. The eyetracker used in this study did not require a chinrest and allowed the 
participant to sit in a chair at a comfortable distance away from the screen. This, along with head 
tracking, allowed participants some freedom to move their heads without compromising the 
eyetracker’s ability to record data was also important during data collection. An eyetracker with 
good temporal resolution (60 Hz), like the one used here, may be more ecologically appropriate. 
However, an eyetracker operating at 120 Hz may collect more and higher quality information, at 
the cost of having to use a chinrest and keeping the head immobile. 
Conclusion 
 All diagnostic tests must be developed with an eye for proper classification of cases and 
rigorously tested to ensure its viability. The present study was an attempt to develop a task to be 
used with an eyetracker that would determine if eyetracking methodology could rival some 
modern malingering detection techniques. Due to its implicit nature and experimental success in 
identifying viewing effects, it was believed that a clinical application may be possible. This 
analog simulator study produced a behavioral measure that has very high psychometric viability 
on its own. Of the multitude of eyetracking variables examined, six were promising, and only 
five of those were of clinical utility at some cutoff values. Of interest is that the majority of those 
useful variables were from the late stages of the trial, rather than the early stages where 
important experimental findings reside. Time course patterns, along with other indices, should be 
considered when evaluating clinical populations. 
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As the use of this equipment and methodology with a clinical agenda in mind is still new 
and experimental, the viable variables and associated cutoff values should not be used as 
independent indicators of malingering at this time. However, supplementing Corrected 
Recognition with one of the five eyetracking variables was able to correctly classify all 48 
participants in the sample. Therefore, there is some evidence that eyetracking may provide 
incremental diagnostic utility to identify cases missed by traditional malingering detection 
measures. Future studies should seek to replicate this methodology with larger samples, but also 
with known reference groups in order to build an evidence base for this technique. Additional 
investigation into the task design, such as altering the difficulty or trial length would also be 
useful. Identifying the best and fewest number of variables needed to make an effective 
judgment about an individual case would be highly valuable, as well. Because analysis of 
eyetracking data can be quite time-consuming, automation of the technical aspects of the process 
would go a long way in demonstrating that eyetracking is easy to use and should improve the 
method’s adoption among researchers and practitioners. 
As mentioned earlier, the clinical and experimental approaches to the same problem 
emphasized different parts of the task in terms of the task’s time course. This is an interesting 
analogy for how practitioners and scientists tend to operate in their separate spaces, seldom 
interacting. By being aware of both approaches, researchers should be able to appreciate the 
differential utility of findings based on context and scope. By integrating them, however, 
researchers stand to gain much more understanding of the populations and methodologies they 
use. 
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STUDY PHASE 
Two blocks – 24 objects seen once per block 
No responses from participant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST PHASE 
One block – 48 three-object displays (24 Target-Present / 24 Target-Absent)  
                                                          Target-Present Display      OR     Target-Absent Display 
                                                    
 
Behavioral Response: Is a studied object present in the display? 
 
Highlighted objects indicate critical objects used for calculation of proportion of viewing time. 
For example, the bee was one of the stimuli in this participant’s study phase, so it is used as the 
critical item in a target-present trial. The blouse and cake were not in the study phase and serve 
as distractors. All three stimuli in the target-absent display did not appear in the study phase. 
After counterbalancing, the sock was selected to be the critical item for this display. Note that 
none of the three objects in this display should have an advantage over the other two based on 
previous viewing, as all three are novel. Highlighting is for illustration only, and was not present 
in actual trials. 
                                                                                               
POSTTEST PHASE 
One block – 48 three-object displays (24 Target-Present / 24 Target-Absent) 
Identical displays from test phase presented in re-randomized order 
Behavioral Response: Where is the studied object located in the display? (Left, Right, Bottom) 
Verbal Response: Is a studied object present in the display? (Yes or No) 
If no studied object is present, instructions were to press any button, then respond, “No.” 
 
Figure 1. Visual Illustration and Brief Descriptions of Task Phases 
+ +1s 3s Until Fixation 3s 
+ + 
10s 
1s 
+ 
6s 6s 
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Figure 2. Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects in Hit and Absent Trials by 
Controls and Simulators in the Test Phase Parsed into 1000 ms Timebins. Error bars represent 
Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that 
timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following display onset). ** p < .01, *** p < .001, h 
denotes Hit trials. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects in Hit, Miss, and Absent 
Trials by Simulators in the Test Phase Parsed into 1000 ms Timebins. Error bars represent 
Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that 
timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following display onset). ** p < .01.
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Figure 4. Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects in Hit and Absent Trials by Controls and Simulators in the Test 
Phase Parsed into 250 ms Timebins. Error bars represent Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). Timebin labels represent the lower-
bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms following display onset). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, h denotes Hit 
trials. 
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Figure 5. Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects in Hit and Absent Trials by Controls and Simulators in the Posttest 
Phase Parsed into 250 ms Timebins. Error bars represent Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). Timebin labels represent the lower-
bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms following display onset). ** p < .01, ** p < .001.
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Figure 6. ROC Curve for Corrected Recognition Data. 
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Figure 7. ROC Curve for Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit 
Trials at the Trial Level. 
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Figure 8. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects During Hit Trials at the Trial Level. 
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Figure 9. ROC Curve for Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit 
Trials at the 1000 ms Level (0, 1000, and 2000 ms timebins). 
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Figure 10. ROC Curve for Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit 
Trials at the 1000 ms Level (3000, 4000, and 5000 ms timebins). 
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Figure 11. ROC Curve for Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit 
Trials at the 250 ms Level (500, 750, 1250, 1500, and 2500 ms timebins). 
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Figure 12. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects at the 1000 ms Level (0, 1000, and 2000 ms timebins). 
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Figure 13. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects at the 1000 ms Level (3000, 4000, and 5000 ms timebins). 
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Figure 14. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects at the 250 ms Level (3000, 3250, 3500, and 3750 ms timebins). 
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Figure 15. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects at the 250 ms Level (4000, 4250, 4500, and 4750 ms timebins). 
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Figure 16. ROC Curve for Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at 
Critical Objects at the 250 ms Level (5000, 5250, 5500, and 5750 ms timebins). 
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Table 1 
 
Mean Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects Across Trial Types by Controls 
and Simulators in the Test Phase 
 
  
Timebin 
  
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 Trial 
Controls 
Hit 
0.489 
(0.02) 
0.625 
(0.026) 
0.623 
(0.034) 
0.570 
(0.037) 
0.508 
(0.035) 
0.482 
(0.038) 
0.560 
(0.025) 
Absent 
0.348 
(0.016) 
0.325 
(0.014) 
0.328 
(0.015) 
0.335 
(0.017) 
0.349 
(0.018) 
0.353 
(0.018) 
0.339 
(0.009) 
Simulators 
Hit 
0.425 
(0.021) 
0.463 
(0.03) 
0.464 
(0.035) 
0.527 
(0.033) 
0.491 
(0.034) 
0.481 
(0.036) 
0.483 
(0.025) 
Miss 
0.377 
(0.027) 
0.472 
(0.034) 
0.434 
(0.036) 
0.424 
(0.041) 
0.370 
(0.033) 
0.308 
(0.038) 
0.398 
(0.023) 
Absent 
0.324 
(0.014) 
0.338 
(0.013) 
0.339 
(0.016) 
0.326 
(0.02) 
0.329 
(0.018) 
0.342 
(0.019) 
0.333 
(0.009) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that 
timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following display onset). 
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Table 2 
 
Mean Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects Across Trial Types by Controls and Simulators in the Test Phase at the 
250 ms Level (0-3000 ms) 
 
Timebin 
  
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 
Controls 
Hit 
0.343 
(0.068) 
0.365 
(0.025) 
0.466 
(0.032) 
0.59 
(0.025) 
0.626 
(0.029) 
0.632 
(0.029) 
0.614 
(0.031) 
0.599 
(0.037) 
0.629 
(0.032) 
0.653 
(0.039) 
0.619 
(0.038) 
0.597 
(0.038) 
Absent 
0.217 
(0.051) 
0.369 
(0.032) 
0.343 
(0.027) 
0.364 
(0.025) 
0.303 
(0.022) 
0.323 
(0.024) 
0.361 
(0.025) 
0.321 
(0.022) 
0.343 
(0.016) 
0.34 
(0.019) 
0.324 
(0.022) 
0.292 
(0.022) 
Simulators 
Hit 
0.516 
(0.099) 
0.375 
(0.026) 
0.36 
(0.025) 
0.475 
(0.029) 
0.506 
(0.029) 
0.445 
(0.031) 
0.439 
(0.041) 
0.436 
(0.05) 
0.436 
(0.042) 
0.467 
(0.039) 
0.45 
(0.036) 
0.495 
(0.038) 
Miss 
0.315 
(0.092) 
0.351 
(0.04) 
0.377 
(0.03) 
0.415 
(0.044) 
0.467 
(0.051) 
0.449 
(0.043) 
0.474 
(0.041) 
0.451 
(0.036) 
0.445 
(0.039) 
0.43 
(0.05) 
0.405 
(0.035) 
0.414 
(0.033) 
Absent 
0.248 
(0.052) 
0.334 
(0.022) 
0.312 
(0.018) 
0.348 
(0.022) 
0.341 
(0.024) 
0.341 
(0.025) 
0.353 
(0.02) 
0.331 
(0.02) 
0.341 
(0.018) 
0.328 
(0.022) 
0.337 
(0.023) 
0.342 
(0.024) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound 
value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms following display onset). 
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Table 3 
 
Mean Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects Across Trial Types by Controls and Simulators in the Test Phase at the 
250 ms Level (3000-6000 ms) 
 
Timebin 
  
3000 3250 3500 3750 4000 4250 4500 4750 5000 5250 5500 5750 
Controls 
Hit 
0.582 
(0.038) 
0.586 
(0.035) 
0.558 
(0.038) 
0.533 
(0.045) 
0.519 
(0.038) 
0.516 
(0.038) 
0.49 
(0.035) 
0.511 
(0.037) 
0.495 
(0.042) 
0.465 
(0.033) 
0.466 
(0.039) 
0.482 
(0.046) 
Absent 
0.329 
(0.021) 
0.325 
(0.02) 
0.356 
(0.025) 
0.349 
(0.018) 
0.33 
(0.018) 
0.336 
(0.024) 
0.353 
(0.02) 
0.359 
(0.023) 
0.359 
(0.024) 
0.365 
(0.023) 
0.353 
(0.025) 
0.346 
(0.025) 
Simulators 
Hit 
0.518 
(0.039) 
0.541 
(0.035) 
0.539 
(0.04) 
0.503 
(0.038) 
0.499 
(0.035) 
0.505 
(0.04) 
0.452 
(0.046) 
0.499 
(0.038) 
0.477 
(0.033) 
0.466 
(0.037) 
0.483 
(0.039) 
0.505 
(0.042) 
Miss 
0.404 
(0.036) 
0.444 
(0.05) 
0.44 
(0.045) 
0.412 
(0.046) 
0.414 
(0.047) 
0.397 
(0.039) 
0.347 
(0.032) 
0.309 
(0.033) 
0.296 
(0.038) 
0.308 
(0.045) 
0.293 
(0.043) 
0.333 
(0.039) 
Absent 
0.349 
(0.026) 
0.341 
(0.028) 
0.303 
(0.019) 
0.305 
(0.022) 
0.32 
(0.015) 
0.328 
(0.017) 
0.316 
(0.022) 
0.343 
(0.025) 
0.374 
(0.03) 
0.34 
(0.025) 
0.325 
(0.021) 
0.312 
(0.024) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms 
following display onset). 
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Table 4 
 
Mean Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects Across Trial Types by Controls and Simulators in the Posttest Phase at 
the 250 ms Level (0-3000 ms) 
 
Timebin 
  
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 
Controls 
Hit 
0.464 
(0.075) 
0.377 
(0.027) 
0.524 
(0.043) 
0.688 
(0.03) 
0.674 
(0.042) 
0.608 
(0.045) 
0.567 
(0.044) 
0.598 
(0.042) 
0.624 
(0.045) 
0.59 
(0.044) 
0.612 
(0.042) 
0.645 
(0.036) 
Absent 
0.265 
(0.065) 
0.351 
(0.036) 
0.347 
(0.026) 
0.312 
(0.028) 
0.354 
(0.033) 
0.349 
(0.019) 
0.378 
(0.041) 
0.313 
(0.032) 
0.289 
(0.023) 
0.31 
(0.024) 
0.322 
(0.027) 
0.357 
(0.033) 
Simulators 
Hit 
0.248 
(0.066) 
0.335 
(0.039) 
0.476 
(0.04) 
0.592 
(0.04) 
0.592 
(0.035) 
0.523 
(0.033) 
0.549 
(0.037) 
0.567 
(0.037) 
0.571 
(0.037) 
0.586 
(0.043) 
0.6 
(0.043) 
0.607 
(0.046) 
Absent 
0.318 
(0.056) 
0.371 
(0.02) 
0.329 
(0.021) 
0.312 
(0.023) 
0.322 
(0.027) 
0.33 
(0.024) 
0.312 
(0.03) 
0.343 
(0.022) 
0.327 
(0.024) 
0.314 
(0.023) 
0.298 
(0.024) 
0.302 
(0.034) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms 
following display onset). 
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Table 5 
 
Mean Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects Across Trial Types by Controls and Simulators in the Posttest Phase at 
the 250 ms Level (3000-6000 ms) 
 
                         Timebin 
  
3000 3250 3500 3750 4000 4250 4500 4750 5000 5250 5500 5750 
Controls 
Hit 
0.623 
(0.032) 
0.625 
(0.036) 
0.62  
(0.033) 
0.6  
(0.037) 
0.583 
(0.037) 
0.576 
(0.036) 
0.577 
(0.036) 
0.567 
(0.037) 
0.547 
(0.037) 
0.529 
(0.039) 
0.542 
(0.038) 
0.532 
(0.04) 
Absent 
0.347 
(0.032) 
0.351 
(0.035) 
0.357  
(0.03) 
0.361 
(0.033) 
0.323 
(0.026) 
0.333 
(0.026) 
0.333 
(0.038) 
0.339 
(0.035) 
0.323 
(0.037) 
0.329 
(0.033) 
0.317 
(0.034) 
0.285 
(0.034) 
Simulators 
Hit 
0.61  
(0.039) 
0.614 
(0.048) 
0.619 
(0.045) 
0.647 
(0.041) 
0.62  
(0.039) 
0.565 
(0.039) 
0.543 
(0.043) 
0.526 
(0.047) 
0.558 
(0.037) 
0.512 
(0.042) 
0.485 
(0.042) 
0.448 
(0.04) 
Absent 
0.355 
(0.028) 
0.379 
(0.026) 
0.344 
(0.025) 
0.33  
(0.023) 
0.324 
(0.023) 
0.324 
(0.028) 
0.308 
(0.025) 
0.325 
(0.015) 
0.296 
(0.027) 
0.305 
(0.028) 
0.302 
(0.027) 
0.335 
(0.029) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms 
following display onset).
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Table 6 
 
Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Miss Trials by Controls and Hit-
Miss Difference Data for Both Groups at the Trial and 1000 ms Levels 
 
 
Timebin 
    0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 Trial 
Controls Miss Trials 
0.389  
(0.072) 
0.516  
(0.064) 
0.547  
(0.083) 
0.735  
(0.082) 
0.611  
(0.101) 
0.713  
(0.101) 
0.601  
(0.048) 
Controls Difference 
0.1  
(0.02) 
0.109  
(0.026) 
0.077  
(0.034) 
-0.165  
(0.037) 
-0.103  
(0.035) 
-0.231  
(0.038) 
-0.042  
(0.025) 
Simulators Difference 
0.047  
(0.031) 
-0.008  
(0.047) 
0.03  
(0.036) 
0.103  
(0.046) 
0.121  
(0.039) 
0.173  
(0.054) 
0.085  
(0.027) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that 
timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following display onset).
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Table 7 
 
Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Miss Trials by Controls and Hit-Miss Difference Data for Both 
Groups at the 250 ms Level (0-3000 ms) 
 
  Timebin 
    0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 
Controls 
Miss 
Trials 
0.333 
(0.167) 
0.458 
(0.122) 
0.251 
(0.085) 
0.442 
(0.103) 
0.552 
(0.103) 
0.52 
(0.1) 
0.467 
(0.105) 
0.469 
(0.109) 
0.501 
(0.108) 
0.536 
(0.108) 
0.593 
(0.109) 
0.527 
(0.11) 
Controls Difference 
0.01 
(0.068) 
-0.092 
(0.025) 
0.215 
(0.032) 
0.147 
(0.025) 
0.074 
(0.029) 
0.112 
(0.029) 
0.148 
(0.031) 
0.13 
(0.037) 
0.128 
(0.032) 
0.117 
(0.039) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
0.07 
(0.038) 
Simulators Difference 
0.196 
(0.162) 
0.024 
(0.056) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
0.06 
(0.039) 
0.039 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.051) 
-0.035 
(0.066) 
-0.014 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(0.054) 
0.037 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
0.081 
(0.036) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms 
following display onset).
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Table 8 
 
Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Miss Trials by Controls and Hit-Miss Difference Data for Both 
Groups at the 250 ms Level (3000-6000 ms) 
 
  Timebin 
    3000 3250 3500 3750 4000 4250 4500 4750 5000 5250 5500 5750 
Controls 
Miss 
Trials 
0.65 
(0.104) 
0.737 
(0.104) 
0.722 
(0.109) 
0.8 
(0.092) 
0.702 
(0.098) 
0.6 
(0.112) 
0.57 
(0.111) 
0.61 
(0.11) 
0.7 
(0.105) 
0.7 
(0.105) 
0.7 
(0.105) 
0.765 
(0.106) 
Controls Difference 
-0.068 
(0.038) 
-0.15 
(0.035) 
-0.165 
(0.038) 
-0.267 
(0.045) 
-0.183 
(0.038) 
-0.084 
(0.038) 
-0.079 
(0.035) 
-0.099 
(0.037) 
-0.205 
(0.042) 
-0.235 
(0.033) 
-0.234 
(0.039) 
-0.283 
(0.046) 
Simulators Difference 
0.114 
(0.05) 
0.096 
(0.055) 
0.099 
(0.047) 
0.091 
(0.049) 
0.085 
(0.048) 
0.108 
(0.048) 
0.105 
(0.054) 
0.19 
(0.046) 
0.181 
(0.049) 
0.157 
(0.059) 
0.19 
(0.06) 
0.172 
(0.047) 
Note. Values in parentheses are Standard Error of the Mean. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms 
following display onset).
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Table 9 
 
ROC Analysis of Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit Trials at 
the Trial and 1000 ms Levels 
 
Timebin AUC SE p Cutoff Se Sp 
0 0.682 0.077 <.05 
.3237770 .167 1.000 
.3316638 .208 0.958 
.3723176 .292 0.875 
.3974044 .375 0.833 
1000 0.79 0.07 <0.001 
.3410504 .208 1.000 
.4059858 .458 0.958 
.4738923 .583 0.917 
.4819337 .625 0.875 
.4904446 .667 0.833 
2000 0.748 0.072 <.01 
.2049895 .083 1.000 
.3469355 .292 0.958 
.4369877 .500 0.875 
.4577337 .542 0.833 
3000 0.561 0.085 0.47 -- -- -- 
4000 0.519 0.085 0.821 -- -- -- 
5000 0.477 0.086 0.789 -- -- -- 
Trial 0.66 0.079 0.058 
.3064914 .125 1.000 
.3995003 .333 0.958 
.4505981 .458 0.875 
.4790418 .500 0.833 
Note. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following 
display onset). AUC = Area Under the Curve, SE = Standard Error of the Mean, p = significance value, Cutoff = 
Test variable cutoff value resulting in given Se and Sp values, Se = Sensitivity, Sp = Specificity. 
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Table 10 
 
ROC Analysis of Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical 
Objects at the Trial and 1000 ms Levels 
 
Timebin AUC SE p Cutoff Se Sp 
0 0.387 0.084 0.18 -- -- -- 
1000 0.332 0.081 <.05 
.244489 .125 0.917 
.426436 .042 1.000 
2000 0.425 0.085 0.375 -- -- -- 
3000 0.816 0.061 <.001 
.092874 .542 0.958 
.194747 .375 1.000 
4000 0.811 0.067 <.001 
-.002003 .792 0.833 
.064732 .708 0.875 
.223531 .292 0.917 
.275184 .208 1.000 
5000 0.901 0.044 <.001 
-.05558 .833 0.833 
.081228 .625 0.958 
.147905 .542 1.000 
Trial 0.767 0.073 <.01 
.110708 .500 0.875 
.135777 .417 0.917 
.176551 .208 0.958 
.269441 .083 1.000 
Note. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-1000 ms following 
display onset). AUC = Area Under the Curve, SE = Standard Error of the Mean, p = significance value, Cutoff = 
Test variable cutoff value resulting in given Se and Sp values, Se = Sensitivity, Sp = Specificity. 
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Table 11 
 
ROC Analysis of Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical Objects During Hit Trials at 
the 250 ms Level 
 
Timebin AUC SE p Cutoff Se Sp 
0 0.392 a 0.093 0.244 -- -- -- 
250 0.474 0.085 0.757 -- -- -- 
500 0.696 0.077 <.05 
.3086700 .333 0.917 
.3390033 .417 0.833 
750 0.736 0.074 <.01 
.3344586 .167 1.000 
.4055339 .292 0.917 
.4388091 .458 0.875 
1000 0.715 a 0.074 0.011 -- -- -- 
1250 0.797 0.068 <.001 
.3957232 .417 0.958 
.4395923 .667 0.917 
.4904247 .708 0.875 
1500 0.757 0.071 <.01 
.3919770 .458 1.000 
.4514972 .583 0.833 
1750 0.691 a 0.078 <.05 -- -- -- 
2000 0.77 a 0.069 <.01 -- -- -- 
2250 0.744 a 0.071 <.01 -- -- -- 
2500 0.738 0.072 <.01 
.3583186 .292 0.958 
.3779201 .333 0.917 
.4027470 .375 0.875 
2750 0.653 0.08 0.07 -- -- -- 
3000 0.607 a 0.082 0.205 -- -- -- 
3250 0.569 0.084 0.409 -- -- -- 
3500 0.513 a 0.085 0.877 -- -- -- 
3750 0.539 a 0.085 0.643 -- -- -- 
4000 0.517 0.085 0.837 -- -- -- 
4250 0.493 a 0.085 0.934 -- -- -- 
4500 0.532 a 0.087 0.703 -- -- -- 
4750 0.5 0.086 1 -- -- -- 
5000 0.51 a 0.085 0.902 -- -- -- 
5250 0.48 a 0.085 0.813 -- -- -- 
5500 0.465 a 0.085 0.68 -- -- -- 
5750 0.456 a 0.085 0.599 -- -- -- 
 Note. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms following 
display onset). Superscript a denotes ROC analyses that had multiple ties between positive and negative state 
variable groups and may have yielded biased statistics. AUC = Area Under the Curve, SE = Standard Error of the 
Mean, p = significance value, Cutoff = Test variable cutoff value resulting in given Se and Sp values, Se = 
Sensitivity, Sp = Specificity. 
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Table 12 
 
ROC Analysis of Hit-Miss Difference in Proportion of Viewing Time Directed at Critical 
Objects at the 250 ms Level 
 
Timebin AUC SE p Cutoff Se Sp 
0 0.591 a 0.103 0.346 -- -- -- 
250 .634 .088 .112 -- -- -- 
500 .172 .061 <.001 -- -- -- 
750 .326 .081 <.05 -- -- -- 
1000 .448 .086 .536 -- -- -- 
1250 .352 .082 .080 -- -- -- 
1500 .339 .087 .055 -- -- -- 
1750 .326 .080 <.05 -- -- -- 
2000 .351 .081 .076 -- -- -- 
2250 .396 .083 .216 -- -- -- 
2500 .526 .085 .757 -- -- -- 
2750 .517 .085 .837 -- -- -- 
3000 .729 .072 <.01 
.119090 .458 0.833 
.164362 .375 0.917 
.200573 .333 0.958 
.318416 .208 1.000 
3250 .783 .069 <.001 
.046147 .625 0.833 
.119298 .458 0.958 
.197254 .375 1.000 
3500 .811 .063 <.001 
.062629 .583 0.833 
.100052 .542 0.917 
.191564 .500 1.000 
    .003750 .625 0.875 
3750 .859 .053 <.001 
.029785 .583 0.958 
.122434 .500 1.000 
4000 .806 .065 <.001 
.017538 .667 0.833 
.119790 .500 0.917 
.182975 .333 0.958 
.215064 .292 1.000 
4250 .766 .071 <.01 
.021827 .750 0.833 
.093456 .542 0.875 
.316745 .208 1.000 
4500 .727 .079 <.01 
.070382 .667 0.875 
.237619 .292 0.917 
.330460 .250 1.000 
4750 .852 .061 <.001 
.041709 .833 0.833 
.074043 .792 0.875 
.119997 .667 0.917 
.309963 .292 1.000 
5000 .901 .043 <.001 
-.01792 .792 0.833 
.028538 .75 0.875 
.105858 .542 0.917 
.170664 .500 1.000 
5250 .891 .050 <.001 
-.11144 .833 0.833 
.027199 .750 0.958 
.102521 .708 1.000 
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5500 .891 .046 <.001 
-.05682 .792 0.833 
.013572 .667 0.917 
.046426 .625 0.958 
.168664 .583 1.000 
5750 .939 .032 <.001 
-.02968 .833 0.875 
-.012184 .792 0.917 
.102297 .583 0.958 
.165275 .542 1.000 
Note. Timebin labels represent the lower-bound value of that timebin (i.e., “0” represents 0-250 ms following 
display onset). Superscript a denotes ROC analyses that had multiple ties between positive and negative state 
variable groups and may have yielded biased statistics. AUC = Area Under the Curve, SE = Standard Error of the 
Mean, p = significance value, Cutoff = Test variable cutoff value resulting in given Se and Sp values, Se = 
Sensitivity, Sp = Specificity.
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Table 13 
 
Diagnostic Utility Statistics for Study Variables Used to Categorize Controls and Simulators in the Present Study 
 
     
Controls Simulators 
     
Type Variable Cutoff Se Sp Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect FPR FNR PPV NPV Complete 
Behavior CR .8020833 0.958 1.0 24 0 23 1 0 0.041667 1 0.96 -- 
Hits-1000 1000 .3410504 .208 1.000 24 0 5 19 0 0.791667 1 0.55814 N 
Hits-1000 1000 .4059858 .458 0.958 23 1 11 13 0.041667 0.541667 0.916667 0.638889 N 
Hits-1000 1000 .4738923 .583 0.917 22 2 14 10 0.083333 0.416667 0.875 0.6875 N 
Hits-1000 1000 .4819337 .625 0.875 21 3 15 9 0.125 0.375 0.833333 0.7 Y 
Hits-1000 1000 .4904446 .667 0.833 20 4 18 6 0.166667 0.25 0.818182 0.769231 Y 
Diff-1000 5000 .081228 .625 0.958 23 1 15 9 0.041667 0.375 0.9375 0.71875 Y 
Diff-1000 5000 .147905 .542 1.000 24 0 13 11 0 0.458333 1 0.685714 Y 
Hits-250 1250 .3957232 .417 0.958 23 1 18 6 0.041667 0.25 0.947368 0.793103 N 
Hits-250 1250 .4395923 .667 0.917 22 2 21 3 0.083333 0.125 0.913043 0.88 N 
Hits-250 1250 .4904247 .708 0.875 21 3 22 2 0.125 0.083333 0.88 0.913043 N 
Diff-250 5750 -0.02968 0.833 0.875 21 3 20 4 0.125 0.166667 0.869565 0.84 Y 
Diff-250 5750 -0.01218 0.792 0.917 22 2 19 5 0.083333 0.208333 0.904762 0.814815 Y 
Diff-250 5750 0.102297 0.583 0.958 23 1 14 10 0.041667 0.416667 0.933333 0.69697 Y 
Diff-250 5750 0.165275 0.542 1 24 0 13 11 0 0.458333 1 0.685714 Y 
Diff-250 5250 -0.11144 0.833 0.833 20 4 20 4 0.166667 0.166667 0.833333 0.833333 Y 
Diff-250 5250 0.027199 0.75 0.958 23 1 18 6 0.041667 0.25 0.947368 0.793103 Y 
Diff-250 5250 0.102521 0.708 1 24 0 17 7 0 0.291667 1 0.774194 Y 
Diff-250 4750 0.041709 0.833 0.833 20 4 20 4 0.166667 0.166667 0.833333 0.833333 Y 
Diff-250 4750 0.074043 0.792 0.875 21 3 19 5 0.125 0.208333 0.863636 0.807692 Y 
Diff-250 4750 0.119997 0.667 0.917 16 8 22 2 0.333333 0.083333 0.733333 0.888889 N 
Diff-250 4750 0.309963 0.292 1 24 0 7 17 0 0.708333 1 0.585366 N 
Note. Numbers in Type column represent level of analysis. Numbers in Variable column represent specific timebin. CR = Corrected Recognition, Cutoff = Test variable cutoff 
value resulting in given Se and Sp values, Se = Sensitivity, Sp = Specificity, FPR = False Positive Rate, FNR = False Negative Rate, PPV = Positive Predictive Value, NPV = 
Negative Predictive Value, Complete = whether using that variable’s cutoff correctly identified the final simulator case.
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Appendix A: 
 
Stimulus Lists  
 
List Stimulus Category List Stimulus Category List Stimulus Category 
A anchor Inanimate B barrel Inanimate C barn Inanimate 
A bus Inanimate B lamp Inanimate C basket Inanimate 
A chair Inanimate B stool Inanimate C desk Inanimate 
A fence Inanimate B truck Inanimate C house Inanimate 
A moon Inanimate B well Inanimate C shoebox Inanimate 
A vase Inanimate B bow Manipulable C coat Manipulable 
A bowl Manipulable B comb Manipulable C cup Manipulable 
A brush Manipulable B crown Manipulable C flag Manipulable 
A glove Manipulable B glass Manipulable C iron Manipulable 
A harp Manipulable B guitar Manipulable C kite Manipulable 
A key Manipulable B lock Manipulable C nut Manipulable 
A nail Manipulable B pot Manipulable C skirt Manipulable 
A pants Manipulable B ruler Manipulable C violin Manipulable 
A pen Manipulable B sock Manipulable C wrench Manipulable 
A saw Manipulable B top Manipulable C bear Organic 
A celery Organic B arm Organic C bread Organic 
A cherry Organic B banana Organic C clown Organic 
A eagle Organic B donkey Organic C finger Organic 
A eye Organic B ear Organic C fly Organic 
A lemon Organic B frog Organic C heart Organic 
A pear Organic B horse Organic C monkey Organic 
A pig Organic B lion Organic C mouse Organic 
A sheep Organic B pepper Organic C snail Organic 
A tomato Organic B seal Organic C swan Organic 
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List Stimulus Category List Stimulus Category List Stimulus Category 
D church Inanimate E cannon Inanimate F car Inanimate 
D clock Inanimate E couch Inanimate F piano Inanimate 
D door Inanimate E ladder Inanimate F sled Inanimate 
D table Inanimate E star Inanimate F wagon Inanimate 
D train Inanimate E stove Inanimate F wheel Inanimate 
D window Inanimate E ball Manipulable F chain Manipulable 
D axe Manipulable E blouse Manipulable F fork Manipulable 
D button Manipulable E boot Manipulable F hammer Manipulable 
D candle Manipulable E bottle Manipulable F hat Manipulable 
D doll Manipulable E broom Manipulable F jacket Manipulable 
D dress Manipulable E drum Manipulable F kettle Manipulable 
D gun Manipulable E mitten Manipulable F knife Manipulable 
D pencil Manipulable E needle Manipulable F shirt Manipulable 
D pliers Manipulable E screw Manipulable F vest Manipulable 
D watch Manipulable E shoe Manipulable F ant Organic 
D carrot Organic E bird Organic F apple Organic 
D cat Organic E cow Organic F cake Organic 
D leaf Organic E deer Organic F corn Organic 
D nose Organic E flower Organic F dog Organic 
D rabbit Organic E goat Organic F duck Organic 
D snake Organic E lips Organic F fish Organic 
D spider Organic E toe Organic F fox Organic 
D thumb Organic E turtle Organic F grapes Organic 
D tree Organic E zebra Organic F onion Organic 
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Appendix B: 
 
Counterbalancing of Stimulus Lists 
 
  Target- Present Displays   Target-Absent Displays 
Participant  Studied Distractor 1 Distractor 2   Foil 1 Foil 2 Foil 3 
1 / 25  A B C   D E F 
2 / 26  B C A   E F D 
3 / 27  C A B   F D E 
4 / 28  D E F   A B C 
5 / 29  E F D   B C A 
6 / 30  F D E   C A B 
7 / 31  A B C   D E F 
8 / 32  B C A   E F D 
9 / 33  C A B   F D E 
10 / 34  D E F   A B C 
11 / 35  E F D   B C A 
12 / 36  F D E   C A B 
13 / 37  A B C   D E F 
14 / 38  B C A   E F D 
15 / 39  C A B   F D E 
16 / 40  D E F   A B C 
17 / 41  E F D   B C A 
18 / 42  F D E   C A B 
19 / 43  A B C   D E F 
20 / 44  B C A   E F D 
21 / 45  C A B   F D E 
22 / 46  D E F   A B C 
23 / 47  E F D   B C A 
24 / 48  F D E   C A B 
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Appendix C: 
 
Experimental Instructions 
Control Instructions: 
“For this experiment, you are going to be completing a memory task. It is extremely important 
that you try your best during this task.” 
Malingering Instructions: 
“For this experiment I would like you to imagine that you were in a car accident in which 
another driver hit your car. You were knocked unconscious, and woke up in the hospital. You 
were kept overnight for observation. The doctors told you that you experienced a concussion.  
 
Try to imagine that a year after the accident, you are involved in a lawsuit against the driver of 
the other car. If you are found to have experienced significant injuries as a result of the accident, 
you are likely to receive a bigger settlement. You have decided to pretend that you are suffering 
from a memory disorder as a result of the accident.  
 
As a part of the lawsuit, you are required to take a test to determine whether or not you actually 
have a memory problem. You are going to complete this test in a moment. If you can 
successfully convince the examiner that you have a memory deficit, you are likely to get a better 
settlement. However, it is important that you perform in a way so that the examiner believes that 
you truly have a memory problem, but that it is not obvious that you are faking.  
 
For example, some strategies that would be too obvious and would alert the examiner that you 
are faking, would be to answer every question incorrectly or to not answer some of the items.  
Once the other experimenter enters the room, you won’t be able to ask any questions about these 
instructions, so, do you have any questions about what you are trying to accomplish during this 
experiment?” 
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Appendix D: 
Post-Test Questionnaire 
1) Recall, in your own words, what the instructed objective was for this experiment. 
 
 
 
 
2) How much effort did you put in to accomplish this objective? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
(No effort)         (Great effort) 
3) How motivated were you to accomplish this objective? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
(Not motivated        (Very motivated) 
at all) 
4) How confident are you that you accomplished this objective? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
(Not confident        (Very confident) 
at all) 
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5) What strategies did you use to accomplish the objective? (check all that apply) 
_______ answered most/all items incorrectly 
_______ answered in a pattern (e.g. alternated between “yes” and “no”) 
_______ answered randomly 
_______ looked purposely away from the task-relevant materials (e.g., looked at some pictures 
but not others) 
_______ blurred vision so could not see stimulus during study or test phase 
_______ attempted to get a certain percentage correct (what percentage? _________)  
_______ did not respond to some/all test items 
_______ took longer than was necessary to respond to test items 
_______ other (please describe): 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
